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ABSTRACT
This dissertation consists of three chapters related to macroeconomic implications
of financial frictions, along with an application of macro-finance models to the Chinese
economy.
The first two chapters focus on government guarantees on business loans to state-
owned enterprises (SOEs), a typical practice of the Chinese government. Chapter
1 embeds partial loan guarantees into the loan contracting problem, built upon the
costly state verification framework. A larger degree of guarantees dampens the sen-
sitivity of the loan rate to a change in leverage, which incentivizes entrepreneurs to
lever up. Also, greater guarantees reduce entrepreneurs’ exposures to credit risks,
hence altering their choices of investment and leverage in response to an exogenous
risk shock.
Chapter 2 proceeds to develop a New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equi-
librium (DSGE) model and investigates the effect of government guarantees on capi-
tal misallocation and business cycle fluctuations in China. On one hand, government
v
guarantees mitigate the influence of the financial accelerator mechanism on invest-
ment and production of both SOEs and private-owned enterprises (POEs). On the
other hand, by inducing a time-varying dispersion in returns on capital across SOEs
and POEs, government guarantees exert a negative impact on the allocative efficiency
of resources and thus cause further losses on total factor productivity (TFP) and out-
put during recessions. Quantitative analyses show that partial loan guarantees to
SOEs are counterproductive in moderating the reaction of GDP to both risk and
technology shocks.
Chapter 3 develops a DSGE model with financial constraints on entrepreneurs and
banks, featuring a risk-based bank capital requirement, and discusses the role of Basel
II in reinforcing procyclical tendencies of the credit market and the real economy. I
study impulse responses of the calibrated model to various shocks. Quantitative
results show that the direction and magnitude of cyclical effects arising from Basel II
strongly depend on the nature of macroeconomic shocks that hit the economy: only
a risk shock can generate noticeable procyclical effect, while the procyclicality under
a TFP shock and the countercyclicality under a shock to the marginal efficiency of
investment (MEI) are quantitatively insignificant.
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Chapter 1
Government Guarantees and Loan Contracting: Partial Equilibrium
1.1 Introduction
Although China has gradually transitioned from a planned economy towards a mar-
ket economy, which has laid groundwork for its phenomenal economic performance
over the past four decades, its government still maintains control over the economy
via multitude of distortionary policies to serve both its economic and political goals.
One defining feature of China’s economic transition lies in its continued favoritism
for state-owned enterprises (SOEs hereafter), a cornerstone of its dual-track eco-
nomic system which allows for the coexistence of SOEs and private-owned enterprises
(POEs hereafter). An important policy measure to support SOEs is to provide im-
plicit and explicit guarantees on bank credit made to firms with state-connectedness.
Specifically, rather than liquidating profit-losing and potentially defaulting SOEs, the
Chinese government typically bails them out and repays their debt via its powerful
control over the state-owned banking system.
Against the backdrop of a relatively underdeveloped financial market in China,
government guarantees can effectively suppress financing costs faced by SOEs, which
is conducive to achievement of economic goals, such as stable economic growth and
low unemployment, and political goals, such as hiring excess labor to prevent social
instability and political turmoil. However, in anticipation that financial losses caused
by SOE defaults will be at least partially covered by the government, lenders are
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more willing to extend credit to SOEs at lower costs relative to POEs with similar
financial status, thereby inducing an inefficient large share of financial and productive
resources misallocated towards the state sector with relatively lower efficiency. This
mechanism is exacerbated during economic downturns due to POEs’ larger exposures
to aggregate risks in the absence of government guarantees, leaving them dispropor-
tionately hampered compared to their state-owned counterparts. Starting from the
year of 2009, when the Chinese government introduced a credit stimulus package to
withstand the impact of the global financial crisis, the phenomenon stated above has
become more apparent over the past decade, when a strengthened financial assis-
tance biased towards SOEs has been closely connected to less efficient allocation of
resources (Bai, Hsieh, and Song 2016; Cong et al. 2019) and a slowdown in aggregate
TFP growth (Bai and Zhang 2015; Tan, Huang, and Woo 2016). Despite a growing
interest in empirically exploring the relation between government guarantees (and
other distortionary policies favoring SOEs) and capital misallocation in China, the
underlying mechanism is far from well-recognized in the existing literature. Moreover,
the implication of government guarantees for China’s business cycles deserves being
explored in more depth.
To the best of my knowledge, this paper, which is composed by first two chapters
of my dissertaion, is the first to adopt the financial accelerator model in the spirit of
Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999, BGG hereafter) to quantitatively delve into
the interplay between government guarantees and capital misallocation, along with
its impact on aggregate fluctuations in the Chinese context. To do this, this paper
proposes a tractable dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) framework as
in Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (CMR, 2014) and extends it by considering firm
heterogeneity in productivity and access to external financing, the latter of which
emerges largely from different degrees of government guarantees. My model delivers
2
two mechanisms through which government guarantees influence the magnitude of
aggregate volatility. On one hand, government guarantees reduce financing costs of
SOEs, thereby acting as a potential stabilizer dampening macroeconomic fluctuations
in the environment where the financial accelerator operates. On the other hand,
government guarantees to SOEs induce a difference in degrees of financial frictions
faced by POEs and SOEs, which in turn translates into differential responses of
their financing costs to aggregate shocks. The consequent increase in the dispersion
of returns on capital deteriorates allocative efficiency and causes further TFP and
output losses during recessions. Since these two channels tend to offset each other,
I calibrate the model to Chinese data and quantitatively evaluate the overall impact
of government guarantees on China’s business cycles.
Serving as a prelude to a more full-fledged macroeconomic anaylsis, Chapter
1 starts with a description of a one-period loan contracting problem between en-
trepreneurs, who are managers of non-financial firms, and the lender, which is a
representative, perfectly competitive bank, in a partial equilibrium setting. Here gov-
ernment guarantees take the form of covering a fraction of loan losses suffered by
the bank due to entrepreneurial defaults. As in BGG, the costly state verification
(CSV) framework à la Townsend (1979) is adopted and extended to tractably em-
body the possibility of (partial) government guarantees. I conduct a comparative
statics analysis to show that a rise in the degree of government guarantees dampens
the sensitivity of the loan rate to a change in leverage, and the resulting lower fi-
nancing cost incentivizes entrepreneurs to lever up. Also, I graphically demonstrate
that greater government guarantees reduce entrepreneurs’ exposures to credit risks
related to the cross-sectional idiosyncratic uncertainty, hence altering entrepreneurs’
choices of investment and leverage in response to an exogenous change in uncertainty,
labeled as a ’risk shock’. These results, albeit simple and intuitive, turn out to have
3
crucial implications for capital allocation and aggregate fluctuations in the general
equilibrium analysis.
In Chapter 2, I incorporate the partial equilibrium contracting problem into a full-
fledged general equilibrium model. The core framework is a New Keynesian DSGE
paradigm augmented with the BGG-type financial accelerator mechanism as in CMR
(2014), subject to risk and productivity shocks. Heterogeneity between POEs and
SOEs, a canonical ingredient in the theoretical literature on the Chinese economy
(e.g., Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti 2011), is also included. In the model environ-
ment where financial frictions are present, government guarantees to SOEs generate
differing exposures to aggregate risks between the two types of firms. More specifi-
cally, in face of an adverse shock, the required return on capital of POEs is elevated
to a larger degree than that of SOEs, leading to a rise in the dispersion of returns on
capital, which implies a greater extent of capital misallocation as emphasized by Hsieh
and Klenow (2009) and Gopinath et al. (2017). In this regard, government guaran-
tees to SOEs, in conjunction with financial frictions faced by both types of firms, not
only impede an efficient allocation of capital in the steady state, but further worsen
the allocative efficiency and depress aggregate productivity during recessions, thereby
potentially amplifying output volatility over the business cycles.
My model shows that, due to the presence of government guarantees to SOEs,
investment and production by these de facto less constrained firms become less re-
sponsive to exogenous shocks relative to the environment without government guar-
antees. Therefore, during economic downturns, government guarantees can attenuate
the downward movement in the price of capital, which exerts a positive spillover
on POEs by muting the financial accelerator mechanism and acts to alleviate the
exogenous pressure on macroeconomic volatility. However, the stabilizing effect of
government guarantees can be offset and even be dominated by the resource misal-
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location effect mentioned in the previous paragraph. The model is calibrated to the
Chinese economy so as to assess the relative magnitude of each effect. Two main
findings stand out regarding the model’s responses to risk and technology shocks.
First, while the potency of the stabilizing effect is revealed by responses of some
aggregate variables (e.g., hours worked and investment), it is outweighed by the mis-
allocation effect which magnifies GDP fluctuations, rendering government guarantees
counterproductive in dampening GDP responses to aggregate shocks. Second, the
quantitative significance of both channels depend on the strength of financial accel-
erator mechanism at work. In particular, while both effects are pronounced when
the economy is hit by a risk shock, they operate far less substantially in the case of
a technology shock wherein the financial accelerator mechanism is fairly modest in
amplifying aggregate volatility.
Layout The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 presents
the related literature. Section 1.3 sets up the loan contracting problem between
entrepreneurs and the bank in a partial equilibrium setting, which parsimoniously
incorporates partial government guarantees on loans to entrepreneurs. Section 1.4
conducts comparative statics to analyze the role of government guarantees. Section
2.1 nests the partial equilibrium analysis within a New Keynesian DSGE model aug-
mented by the BGG-type financial accelerator mechanism, featuring two types of
non-financial firms. Section 2.2 explores how government guarantees can potentially
hurt allocative efficiency of capital and cause TFP and output losses. Section 2.3




This paper intersects with several branches of literature. First, this paper comple-
ments a growing body of literature which explores the relation between policy and
institutional distortions and resource misallocation in China. This literature focuses
on evaluating the magnitude of capital/labor misallocation, and potential output
gains which can be achieved by reallocating resources from firms with lower marginal
products to those with higher marginal products. These contributions include but
are not limited to Hsieh and Klenow (2009), Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2011),
Brandt, Tombe, and Zhu (2013), Hsieh and Song (2015), Song and Wu (2015) and
Wu (2017). However, the time-varying extent of resource misallocation and its link
to business cycles are largely overlooked. To address the gap in the literature, I in-
corporate the spirits of papers cited above into a tractable general equilibrium model
in which the extent of the misallocation effect emanating from distortionary credit
policies can vary over business cycles, and thus interacts with aggregate fluctuations.
This paper is also related to a new wave of research which studies the credit
allocation across firms with different degrees of political connection during the Chi-
nese government’s attempt to combat economic recessions, as well as its relation to
China’s recent economic slowdown (e.g., Bai, Hsieh, and Song 2016; Ru 2018; Cong et
al. 2019; Huang, Pagano, and Panizza forthcoming). Closest to my paper is Cong et
al. (2019), who find that China’s economic stimulus package of 2009-2010 during the
global financial crisis channels credit towards low-productivity state-connected firms,
and thus worsens the allocation of resources across firms. My paper can be viewed as
a theoretical investigation of the underlying mechanism behind the empirical regular-
ities documented in these papers. In related work, Chang et al. (2019) provide one of
the first frameworks embedding uncollateralized borrowing constraints into a DSGE
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model with Chinese characteristics. My paper shares their focus on credit allocation
between POEs and SOEs, but differs from theirs in that I assume capital market dis-
tortions as in BGG and CMR (2010, 2014), whereas a working capital constraint is
adopted in their setting. This difference allows me to highlight the role of the financial
accelerator mechanism in generating a time-varying dispersion in returns on capital.
The resulting countercyclical misallocation effect and its amplification on aggregate
fluctuations, which are important focuses of my study, are ignored in Chang et al.
(2019).
This paper also belongs to the theoretical literature emphasizing financial frictions
as a crucial source of capital misallocation (e.g., Gilchrist, Sim, and Zakrajšek 2013;
Midrigan and Xu 2014; Moll 2014; Buera and Moll 2015; Gopinath et al. 2017). In
this paper, capital misallocation emerges as an unintended consequence of government
guarantees, which are initially meant to ease financial frictions of SOEs so as to
stabilize the economy. The gist of the idea that in an economy with firms facing
heterogeneous degrees of financial frictions, well-intended policies can give rise to
resource misallocation which can in turn counteract and even reverse the intended
effect of policies, is consistent with recent studies of Bleck and Liu (2018), Sun (2018),
Kurtzman and Zeke (2019), Jo and Senga (2019), and Liu, Xu, and Wang (2019).
Despite being motivated by unconventional monetary policies outside the context of
China, the contribution of Kurtzman and Zeke (2019) is closest to my paper. They
argue that purchases of corporate securities enacted by the central bank can elicit
capital misallocation via their heterogeneous impacts on firms’ credit spreads, thereby
reducing the efficiency of private security purchases in stimulating output. My paper
shares similarity with theirs in that differential responses of firms’ financing costs to
exogenous shocks can induce endogenous and time-varying misallocation of capital,1
1The relation between dispersion in costs of debt and resource misallocation is also discussed in
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which can offset the positive effect of government policies.
More broadly, this paper expands on the literature studying macroeconomic im-
pacts of second-moment shocks. Compared to the inaction effect proposed in Bloom
(2009) and Bloom et al. (2018), this paper is closer to CMR (2010, 2014) in the sense
that a second-moment shock, termed a ’risk shock’ throughout the rest of this paper,
affects macroeconomic volatility by generating a countercyclical external finance pre-
mium in the context of a financial accelerator model.2 On top of its impact on the
economy-wide financing cost, this paper sheds light on a complementary mechanism
via which the risk shock can contribute to economic fluctuations: an increased level
of risk channels credit and input resources towards firms with smaller exposures to
heightened uncertainty while with lower productivity, which depresses aggregate TFP
and further hurts output. While this paper is largely motivated by institutional fea-
tures and stylized facts regarding the Chinese economy, the ’flight-to-quality’ pattern
in resource allocation, alongside its resulting aggregate effect, should be able to apply
broadly to more sophisticated models featuring firms with heterogeneous financial
positions.3 In this sense, the risk shock can be interpreted as a resource misallocation
shock, following the spirit of Asker, Collard-Wexler, and De Loecker (2014).
1.3 The Financial Contract with Government Loan Guarantees: Partial
Equilibrium
This section provides a description of the loan contracting problem between en-
trepreneurs and the lender, which is a representative, perfectly competitive bank,
Gilchrist, Sim, and Zakrajšek (2013).
2This mechanism is also explored in, e.g., Gilchrist, Sim, and Zakrajšek (2014), and Chugh (2016).
3From the perspective of linking firms’ heterogeneous exposures to aggregate risks to dispersion
in marginal products of capital, the latter of which gives rise to capital misallocation, this paper
echoes the spirit of David, Schmid, and Zeke (2019).
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in a partial equilibrium setting. The government provides partial guarantees on loans
to entrepreneurs by covering a fraction of loan losses suffered by the bank due to
entrepreneurial defaults. As in BGG, a defaultable loan contract is motivated by the
CSV framework à la Townsend (1979), extended to tractably capture government
guarantees. As will be shown in detail below, the inclusion of loan guarantees sup-
presses financing costs faced by entrepreneurs and incentivizes them to expand their
leverages. The price and expected return of capital are taken as given in this sec-
tion, and will be endogenously determined when I incorporate the partial equilibrium
analysis into a full-blown DSGE model in the subsequent chapter.
1.3.1 Model Environment
There are two unit continuums of risk-neutral entrepreneurs, indexed by j ∈ {P,S}.
Each entrepreneur manages a non-financial firm of the corresponding type. The type
of each entrepreneur and the non-financial firm she manages is exogenously fixed,
and is publicly observable to all agents in the economy. Features which differentiate
the two types of entrepreneurs/firms will be specified in next chapter; as of now, it
suffices to be noted that profit rates of capital generated from production can vary
across these two types of firms.
At the end of period t, and before the realization of aggregate shocks at period
t+1, each existing j-type entrepreneur (j ∈ {P,S}) acquires capital from capital goods
producers at the nominal price Qt and carries it into period t + 1 for the firm she
manages to produce. Undepreciated capital is sold back to the latter after production,
and the average nominal return on capital across j-type entrepreneurs can be written
as:
RjK,t+1 =




where φjt+1 is the gross marginal revenue product of capital (MRPK) generated from
production. Note that RjK,t+1 is revealed at period t + 1, while capital purchase
decisions can only be made conditional on the information available at period t.
Also, I assume that capital is homogeneous and is thus easily transferable between
two types of entrepreneurs. This assumption ensures that the nominal price of capital,
Qt, is common across entrepreneurs, and the difference in average returns on capital
only arises from the divergence of MRPK.
At the end of period t, the state of a typical entrepreneur is summarized by her
net worth and type. A j-type entrepreneur with net worth N j in her hand combines it





N j +BjN,t+1. After production occurs at period t+1, the entrepreneur experiences an
idiosyncratic shock, ωt+1, converting her nominal return on capital into ωt+1RjK,t+1.
The random variable, ωt+1, with cumulative distribution Ψt+1 (x) ≡ Pr (ωt+1 ≤ x) ,
density ψt+1 (x), and mean of 1, is uncorrelated across time and entrepreneurs of both
types. However, I allow the cross-sectional variance of ωt+1 to fluctuate stochastically
over time. The standard deviation of lnωt+1, denoted as σt+1, is subject to the
following shock process:
lnσt+1 = (1− ρσ) lnσ + ρσlnσt + εσ,t+1, (1.2)
with ρσ ∈ (0, 1) denoting the persistence of the shock, σ the steady-state value of
σt+1, and εσ,t+1 an i.i.d. shock with εσ,t+1 ∼ N (0, σ2σ). The time-varying standard
deviation of the idiosyncratic shock is one source of uncertainty in my model, and is
referred to as the risk shock following the terminology of CMR (2014). The risk shock
affects the probability of entrepreneurial default on bank loans and directly influences
the amount of bank credit towards entrepreneurs, and can thus be interpreted as a
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financial shock. Also, both parties to the contract have full information about the ex-
ante distribution of idiosyncratic shocks. However, the realized value of ωt+1 is directly
observed only by the entrepreneur, while the bank must pay a fixed proportion of the
entrepreneur’s asset as monitoring costs to verify its true value.
1.3.2 The Financial Contract
Now I can formally describe the loan contracting problem between a typical j-type
entrepreneur and the representative bank. As in Townsend (1979) and BGG, the
optimal contract involves a standard debt-like loan contract: the bank charges loan
rates based on publicly observable variables and monitors the entrepreneur if she fails
to repay the loans. Therefore, I assume that an entrepreneur with N j negotiates







loan amount of BjN,t+1 and a type-specific promised nominal loan rate of Z
j
t+1.4 There
exists a cutoff level ωjN,t+1, which is the minimum realized value of idiosyncratic shock










The entrepreneur defaults on her loan if she is hit by ωt+1 lower than ωjN,t+1. In case
of default, the bank monitors and seizes the entrepreneur’s assets with a remaining
value of (1− µ)ωt+1RjK,t+1QtK
j
N,t+1, where µ denotes the fraction paid by the bank
as monitoring costs, which can be broadly interpreted as deadweight losses associated
with bankruptcy.



















































By the law of large numbers, Ft+1 represents the share of capital earnings obtained
by j-type entrepreneurs with N j after the idiosyncratic shock at period t + 1, ωt+1,
is realized.
Under the setup of BGG, capital earnings are split between entrepreneurs, the
bank, and monitoring costs, hence the share earned by the bank from its diversified























Different from BGG, partial loan guarantees provided by the government are present
in the model. Specifically, in the event of the j-type entrepreneurs’ default, the
government acts as the loan guarantor and covers a fixed portion, λj ∈ [0, 1), of
the gap between the amount of promised repayment according to loan contracts and
the actual revenues received by the bank. The average amount of losses on loans to
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And the government subsidizes the bank with an average amount of λjHt+1RjK,t+1QtK
j
N,t+1
which partially covers its losses from defaults of entrepreneurs who take the loans.










I denote the required rate of return on bank loans as Rt, which is determined by the
bank’s balance sheet condition at period t and is thus a preset variable independent
of realized aggregate shocks at period t+ 1. Then the participation constraint for the






















Note that free entry condition ensures that the strict equality in (1.9) holds in every
state of nature.
There is a caveat about the timing and contingency of the contract described
above. As in BGG and CMR (2014), the representative bank in my model is taken
as a ’pass-through’ financial intermediary free from insolvency. However, since the
contract between each entrepreneur and the bank is drawn up before the aggregate
uncertainty is resolved, any loan agreement with non-contingent loan rates can expose
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the bank to aggregate risks due to possible violation of (1.9). To insulate the bank
from lending losses, I assume that loan contracts are signed contingent on publicly
observable variables (including type-specific and aggregate ones) realized at period
t+ 1.5 Therefore, entrepreneurs undertake all costs associated with defaults via type-
specific loan rates contingent on the state of nature realized at period t+1. However,
we need to keep in mind that loan contracts cannot be perfectly contingent on realized
values of idiosyncratic shocks to entrepreneurs, as stated above.
To exploit the linearity of entrepreneurs’ preferences and facilitate within-type






, and, combined with (1.3), the entrepreneur’s objective defined in



































can be equivalently represented by a combination of (ωjN,t+1, L
j
N,t). Therefore, an opti-
mal contract involves a set of (ωjN,t+1, L
j
N,t) which maximizes (1.10) subject to (1.11).
Since the net worth shows up in a linear fashion in the objective function and is
absent in the constraint, the same set of (ωjN,t+1, L
j
N,t) will be selected by all j-type
entrepreneurs regardless of their net worth. I henceforth drop the subscript N to
lighten the notation, and the loan rate common to all j-type entrepreneurs can be
5Alternatively, we can assume that the government can implement an deposit insurance scheme
for the bank by taxing/subsidizing entrepreneurs when the bank’s profit is negative/positive, as in
De Fiore, Teles, and Tristani (2011).
14









which is conditional on the realized value of RjK,t+1. Combining (1.11) and (1.12)



















1.4 Comparative Statics: the Role of Loan Guarantees
Based on the detailed description of the loan contracting problem, this section starts
with a comparative statics exercise studying the mechanism via which government
guarantees influence the entrepreneurial leverage and credit spread. Also, I illustrate
how a change in the degree of government guarantees can alter the choice of leverage
in response to an increase in the dispersion of cross-sectional idiosyncratic uncertainty.
Note that, in this section, an entrepreneur’s type is not crucial to the main results,
and we are only concerned with only one period of time, hence time subscript and
type superscript are both deleted for notational convenience.
Note that by setting λ ∈ [0, 1), I exclude the case of λ = 1 in its range of possible
values. While adding realism, the restriction that λ 6= 1 is imposed mainly for
technical reasons. Intuitively, if λ = 1, i.e., the government provides full guarantees
on bank loans, the loan rate will be fixed at R instead of increasing in the leverage
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ratio L. Consequently, the trade-off between the leveraged return and financing costs
vanishes, and the entrepreneur will be incentivized to borrow an infinite amount,6
which cannot occur under the equilibrium. Therefore, to keep the model equilibrium
well-defined, it is necessary to rule out the case of λ = 1.
To ensure that the interior solution is a non-rationing outcome, i.e., only the
equilibrium under which ω lies below the maximum feasible value is considered, I








Note that this inequality is a relatively weak condition and is satisfied by the log-
normal distribution, which is the distribution of the idiosyncratic shocks used in this
paper.
To highlight the role of loan guarantees, it is useful to conduct a comparative stat-
ics exercise regarding the impact of a change in the degree of government guarantees,
represented by λ, on the cutoff value ω, the leverage ratio L, and the credit spread
Z/R. The result is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition Suppose the assumption in (1.14) holds, then given the expected external
finance premium E (R
K
/R) and the standard deviation of idiosyncratic shocks, σ, an
increase in λ raises both ω and L, while its effect on Z/R is ambiguous.
Proof: See Appendix A.2.
Figure 1.1 illustrates key economic mechanisms of the proposition stated above. In
all three panels of Figure 1.1, dash-dotted curves represent a typical entrepreneur’s in-
difference curves, while the bank’s zero-profit conditions are exhibited by solid curves,
6See Appendix A.1 for a rigorous proof of this result.
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Figure 1.1: Effects of a Rise in λ
with the credit spread Z/R and leverage L displayed on the vertical and horizontal




) and σ are both fixed exogenously in Figure 1.1.
Panel A shows a set of the entrepreneur’s indifference curves and the bank’s zero-profit
curve under a specific λ. The entrepreneur’s expected return increases towards lower-
right part of the graph, where she can choose the same leverage with a lower loan
rate: this also explains the upward-sloping shape of her indifference curves. Similarly,
the bank’s zero-profit curve also has a positive slope, which can be derived intuitively
by observing that a higher loan rate is required to compensate the bank for a larger
probability of loan default (which is at best partially covered by the government)
associated with a higher level of leverage. Also, all combinations above (below) the
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zero-profit curve satisfies (violates) the bank’s participation constraint. As is shown
in panel A, the optimal contract is represented by the combination (L0, Z0/R) at
which the entrepreneur’s indifference curve is tangent to the bank’s zero-profit curve.
Now I am in the position to illustrate main results of the comparative statics
exercise in panel B. As is shown in panel A, the optimal loan contract trades off
the leveraged return on an additional of loans against financing costs pertaining to
a higher probability of default by taking this loan. As is manifested in (1.13), a rise
in the degree of loan guarantee, λ, alters this trade-off by dampening the sensitivity
of the loan rate to a change in leverage. Intuitively, in face of a leverage expan-
sion, a greater λ indicates that the government undertakes an larger portion of the
entrepreneur’s debt obligation in case the latter cannot fully repay, and thus a less
degree of increase in interest rate is required to compensate the bank for the share of
loan losses it needs to bear. Therefore, the loan rate charged by the bank reacts less
sensitively to the variation in the entrepreneurial leverage. Graphically, an increase
in λ rotates the bank’s zero-profit curve downward, reflecting the decline in credit
spread given the same level of leverage. A reduced loan rate induces the entrepreneur
to lever up, which leads to a higher leverage and a higher cutoff value ω (the latter not
shown in Figure 1.1). With a larger λ, the choice of leverage and the corresponding
credit spread under the optimal contract corresponds to the combination (L1, Z1/R)
in panel B.
While an increase in λ unambiguously raises both ω and L, its impact on Z/R
is unclear. More specifically, a rise in λ has two counteracting effects on the credit
spread. A flattening zero-profit curve of the bank, prompted by a larger λ, drives
down the credit spread if the entrepreneur maintains her original amount of borrowing,
which can be directly derived from (1.13), holding ω fixed. However, since the initial
leverage, L0, is not optimal under the new value of λ, this is not the only effect in place.
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Figure 1.2: Responses to a Rise in σ under Different λ
Rather, the entrepreneur is incentivized by the lower financing costs to scale up her
leverage, generating an upward force upon the credit spread. Which effect is stronger
depends on shapes of the entrepreneur’s indifference curves and the bank’s zero-profit
curve. These are in turn determined by our choice of related parameters, which will
be detailed below. Panel B shows a case in which the second effect dominates, while
in panel C the second effect is not strong enough to completely offset the first one.
Again for illustrative purposes, I use a similar graphical representation to demon-
strate how a change in the degree of government guarantees potentially affects an
entrepreneur’s leverage choice in response to an increase in risk.7 Panel A (B) of
Figure 1.2 depicts responses of entrepreneurial leverage and credit spread to a jump
in risk, reflected by an increased σ, under a smaller (larger) λ. A heightened uncer-
tainty raises the left tail risk (and thus the default probability) of the entrepreneur,
and the bank passes the resulting increase in monitoring costs on the entrepreneur
by charging a higher loan rate, which is reflected on a higher credit spread under the
original level of leverage L0. Hence a rise in σ rotates the bank’s zero-profit curve
7A formal proposition and its rigorous mathematical proof, complicated by different initial levels
of ω implied by different λ, go beyond my purpose of gaining intuitions, and are thus omitted here.
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upward in both panels of Figure 1.2. In both cases, a higher financing cost forces the
entrepreneur to disinvest and deleverage. However, a change in the degree of gov-
ernment guarantees alters the sensitivity of credit spread to the increase in σ. Since
government guarantees partially cover loan losses owing to entrepreneurial default
and implicitly reduce the proportion of credit risks borne by the entrepreneur, the
bank’s zero-profit curve shifts up to a lesser extent in reaction to a rise in σ under
a larger λ. The reduced responsiveness of financing costs dampens the impact of a
jump in σ on the entrepreneurial leverage: comparing panels A and B in Figure 1.1
reveals that an entrepreneur who enjoys a smaller (larger) degree of loan guarantees
deleverages more (less) extensively. In this sense, government guarantees serve to
reduce the entrepreneur’s exposure to credit risks related to the dispersion in the
cross-sectional idiosyncratic uncertainty.
Although the above comparative statics analysis is conducted in a partial equilib-
rium framework, conditional on a fixed value of E (R
K
/R), it is noteworthy to point
out its main implications when it is embedded into the general equilibrium context,
in which the price and the expected return of capital are endogenized, and two types
of entrepreneurs, managing corresponding types of non-financial firms enjoying differ-
ent levels of government guarantees, coexist. First, by essentially easing the financial
constraints faced by entrepreneurs and firms, government guarantees mitigate the
macroeconomic impact of the financial accelerator mechanism, whereby the interac-
tion between economic activity and the price of capital constitutes a feedback loop
amplifying aggregate fluctuations. Second, heterogeneous responses of leverage and
capital choices, which stem from the deviation in degrees of financial constraints due
to government guarantees favoring a specific subset of firms, can induce credit and
capital allocation between two types of firms. A misallocation effect and consequent
output losses arise if capital is reallocated to firms with lower productive efficiency.
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The two effects stated above can only be evaluated quantitatively in a full-fledged
DSGE model, as will be developed in the next chapter.
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Chapter 2
Government Guarantees, Capital Misallocation and China’s Business Cy-
cles: General Equilibrium
2.1 New Keynesian DSGE Model
In this section, the loan contracting problem studied in the previous chapter is in-
corporated into a New Keynesian DSGE model. It is useful to start by providing an
overview of the model structure and a description of the sequence of events. Subsec-
tion 2.1.2 characterizes the aggregate behavior of the entrepreneurial sector, which
is closely related to section 1.3 of Chapter 1, along with production decisions of
non-financial firms managed by entrepreneurs. Apart from the specification of the
monetary policy rule, the rest of the model is fairly standard. Subsections 2.1.3-2.1.5
outline the remainder of production sectors, in which problems of intermediate goods
producers, retailers, final goods producers and capital goods producers are described
in turn. Subsections 2.1.6 and 2.1.7 discuss households and the representative bank,
respectively. Partial loan guarantees on SOEs, as well as fiscal and monetary policies,
which are all implemented by the government, are described in subsection 2.1.8. Fi-
nally, subsection 2.1.9 gives an account of the model equilibrium and closes the model.
Details about derivation of optimality conditions of various sectors are relegated to
Appendix B.1 for brevity.
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2.1.1 Model Structure and Timing of Events
I consider a discrete-time economy with an infinite horizon. This economy is composed
of two types of entrepreneurs and corresponding non-financial firms, intermediate
goods producers, retailers, final goods producers, capital goods producers, households,
a representative bank and the government. Figure 2.1 depicts the structure of the
model and the flow of resources among different sectors of the economy.
Figure 2.1: Model Structure
In parallel with the entrepreneurial heterogeneity described in Chapter 1, non-
financial firms are correspondingly categorized into two types, labeled P and S, which
are different along two dimensions: average productivity and ease of access to exter-
nal financing. More specifically, P-type firms are on average more productive than
S-type ones. However, only S-type firms enjoy partial loan guarantees from the gov-
ernment, which gives them de facto privileged access to bank credit. Each firm is
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managed by an entrepreneur of the same type, and uses capital channeled from the
entrepreneur and labor supplied by households for production, subject to a common
shock to aggregate productivity. An entrepreneur obtains a bank loan and purchases
capital from capital goods producers, which is then sold back to the latter after pro-
duction. As is demonstrated in section 1.3 of Chapter 1, entrepreneurs are then hit
by idiosyncratic shocks to their returns on capital, and a fraction of them default
on their loans and declare bankruptcy. Following Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti
(2011), the assumption of two-type heterogeneity matches the central differences be-
tween POEs and SOEs, which are natural counterparts of P- and S-type firms in
reality, respectively, and stands as a crucial novel feature in comparison to canonical
DSGE models with a BGG-type financial accelerator mechanism.1 Besides, this set-
ting captures a combination of policy distortions, reflected in government guarantees
to firms with lower productive efficiency, and financial frictions, which are identified
by Wu (2017) as two most important sources of capital misallocation in China. Note
that different from collateral constraints à la Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), which are
adopted in Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2011) and some other theoretical stud-
ies related to the impact of financial heterogeneity on China’s resource misallocation
(e.g., Bleck and Liu 2018; Guo, Jiang, and Shi 2018; Liu, Wang, and Xu 2019),
this paper uses the BGG-type setting to motivate a defaultable loan contract. As is
shown in the previous chapter, the CSV framework allows me to include government
guarantees parsimoniously. Moreover, this modification enables me to endogenously
generate time-varying and heterogeneous responses of investment and production to
exogenous shocks, as I will elaborate below. To avoid self-financing, I assume that
at each period a constant fraction of firms exit the market, which are replaced by an
1Outside the context of the Chinese economy, the approach of two-type productivity heterogeneity
is also pursued in, e.g., Kiyotaki (1998), Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014), Collard, et al. (2017),
Nuño and Thomas (2017), and Caggese and Pérez-Orive (2018).
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identical measure of new entrants with net worth transferred from households.
Aside from providing guarantees on loans to S-type entrepreneurs/firms, the gov-
ernment also acts as the monetary and fiscal authority. Consistent with China’s
monetary policy framework over the past two decades, I assume that the government
sets the growth rate of broad money supply, which is comprised of households’ hold-
ing of cash and bank deposits, as the intermediate target, instead of a target risk-free
rate more commonly used in the DSGE literature. Also, I make the convenient as-
sumption (though involves no loss of generality) that the government chooses cash as
its only monetary policy instrument.
The rest of my model closely follows the standard DSGE setup. Households are
ultimate owners of various firms/producers and the bank. They have preferences
over consumption, labor, and money balance (or cash for short), and allocate savings
between cash and bank deposits. The bank takes deposits from households and chan-
nels funds to entrepreneurs, subject to a reserve requirement policy. Capital goods
producers transform final goods into capital goods readily usable for production of
non-financial firms. The products of P- and S-type firms are assembled by interme-
diate goods producers to produce intermediate goods, which in turn are used by mo-
nopolistically competitive retailers to repackage into differentiated retail goods. Note
that this setting implicitly assumes that both P- and S-type firms are upstream firms.
In reality, SOEs are relatively concentrated in the upstream sector while downstream
industries are open to private firms to a greater extent. However, my model abstracts
from this issue so I can focus on the role of heterogeneity regarding productivity
and access to credit between P- and S-type firms.2 The Calvo-style nominal rigidity
is introduced in pricing decisions of retailers, generating a New-Keynesian Phillips
2See, e.g., Li, Liu and Wang (2015) and Sun (2018) for models exploring the macroeconomic
implications of this vertical production structure in the Chinese economy.
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Curve which relates nominal to real variables. Final goods producers combine a con-
tinuum of retail goods into homogeneous final output, which is then converted into
consumption of households, investment of capital goods producers, and goods used
in bank monitoring. I adopt this production structure to ensure that firms making
price setting decisions are separated from those facing financial frictions, and thus
preserve model tractability.
Based on the model environment described above, the events at period t unfold
as follows.
1. Aggregate shocks are realized. Both P- and S-type firms use capital acquired
by entrepreneurs and labor supplied by households to produce, and pay wage
bills. Production of intermediate goods, retail goods and final goods occur.
2. Idiosyncratic shocks to returns on capital are realized. Entrepreneurs with low
realization choose to default, and the bank monitors and takes over defaulting
entrepreneurs’ assets. The government partially guarantees the repayment of
bank loans made to S-type entrepreneurs by covering a portion of credit losses
caused by default. Also, a fixed proportion of entrepreneurs exit from the mar-
ket, replaced by an equal mass of new entrants with transfers from households
as their startup net worth.
3. Households make consumption and asset portfolio decisions. Capital goods
producers purchase a fraction of final goods as investment to build aggregate
capital stock.
4. Existing entrepreneurs of both types negotiate loan contracts with the bank, and
combine the loans with their own net worth to purchase capital from capital
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goods producers, which are brought into period t + 1 for production of non-
financial firms they manage. The cycle continues.
2.1.2 Entrepreneurs and Non-Financial Firms
This subsection is closely connected to section 1.3 in Chapter 1. I start with delving
into the implication of the loan contracting problem for the aggregate behavior of the
entrepreneurial sector, and then characterize the production of non-financial firms
managed by entrepreneurs.
Recall that the optimal contract between a typical j-type entrepreneur (j ∈ {P,S})
and the bank is summarized by a combination of (ωjt+1, L
j
t), which is identical across
all j-type entrepreneurs independent of their net worth. This feature facilitates aggre-
gation of entrepreneurs within the same type. Denote the aggregate entrepreneurial
net worth of type j at the end of period t as N jt , and the demand for capital from






Also, each entrepreneur faces a constant probability, γ, of being forced out of the
economy, and exiting firms transfer their net worth to households. Following the com-
mon practice in the macroeconomics literature on financial frictions, this assumption
is imposed to avoid the possibility that entrepreneurs can overcome financing con-
straints by accumulating enough net worth in the long run. To keep the measure of
each type of entrepreneurs/firms fixed, an equal mass of entrants enter into the econ-
omy at each period with an initial transfer from households. Therefore, N jt consists
of net worth of existing entrepreneurs and the initial equity of new entrants, and the
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evolution of total entrepreneurial net worth across j-type entrepreneurs can thus be
expressed as:










where W e is the lump-sum transfer to new entrepreneurs from households, which is
a sufficiently small number under reasonable calibration.
A j-type firm indexed i is managed by an entrepreneur of the same type. After
aggregate shocks are realized, the firm, holding capital Kji,t purchased from capital
goods producers by its corresponding entrepreneur, hires labor from the representative
household, Hji,t, at a competitive nominal wage rate, Wt, and produces j-type goods










where α ∈ (0, 1), and Ajt represents the level of productivity prevailing across j-type
firms, with a mean of Aj and evolves according to:




t−1 + εA,t ,
where ρA ∈ (0, 1), A
j is the steady-state value of Ajt , and εA,t ∼ N (0, σ2A) is an i.i.d.
aggregate productivity shock common to both types of firms.3 Following the lead of
traditional RBC literature, a shock to aggregate productivity is introduced as another
source of aggregate risks in the model, and can be considered as a non-financial shock.
Also, it is assumed that P-type firms are on average more productive than S-type ones,
i.e., AP > AS. Given that P- and S-type firms are directly analogous to POEs and
3Type-specific productivity shocks are not considered in this paper. See Guo, Jiang, and Shi
(2018) and Chang et al. (2019) for discussions related to how the economy responds to SOE- or
POE-specific technology shocks.
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SOEs, respectively, in China, this assumption coincides with the fact that POEs enjoy
higher productive efficiency than SOEs, a well-documented empirical observation in
the literature on the Chinese economy.4
After production, the firm sells its output to the competitive intermediate goods






















)1−α −WtHji,t} . (2.3)
Maximizing out over labor choice leads to a common capital-labor ratio across all













































Note that the MRPK of j-type firms, φjt , depends on type-specific variables (price
P jt and productivity A
j
t). Heterogeneities in productivity and degree of financial con-
straints, the latter of which arises from government guarantees on loans to a specific
type of firms, can potentially generate differences in marginal revenue products of
4These papers include, but are not limited to, Zhang, Zhang, and Zhao (2001), Brandt, Hsieh,
and Zhu (2008), Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2011), Hsieh and Song (2016), Berkowitz, Ma,
and Nishioka (2017).
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capital, and, recalling from (1.1), average returns on capital, between the two types
of firms. As I will elaborate in the subsequent section, the endogenous dispersion in
MRPK and returns on capital can produce time-varying allocative efficiency and thus
serves to amplify aggregate fluctuations.
Also, since all firms within each type face the same constant-return-to-scale tech-
nology, we can represent the continuum of firms indexed j (j ∈ {P,S}) by defining a


































where the third equality uses (2.4).
2.1.3 Intermediate Goods Producers
A perfectly competitive, representative intermediate goods producer bundles outputs
























where ς denotes the relative weight of P-type products entering the homogeneous
intermediate goods, and θ is the elasticity of substitution between goods produced by
the two types of firms.
As is shown in detail in Appendix B.1, the standard cost-minimization and zero-
















































2.1.4 Retailers and Final Goods Producers






















where ε is the elasticity of substitution among varieties of retail goods. The demand












where P Fi,t is the price of retail goods i. Also, final good is used as numeraire, hence
its price, denoted as Pt, also indicates the aggregate price level.
A monopolistically competitive retailer i repackages intermediate goods, Y Ii,t, into





price setting of retailers is subject to the Calvo-style stickiness: only a randomly
selected portion 1 − κ of retailers can adjust their prices optimally in each period;
the complementary fraction of retailers index their prices to the steady-state gross
inflation rate, i.e., P Fi,t = ΠP
F
i,t−1. Firms being allowed to reoptimize at period t choose












2.1.5 Capital Goods Producers
Capital goods producers are owned by households. At period t, after the chain of
production occurs, a representative capital goods producer purchases a fraction of
final goods at price Pt and transforms them into investment goods of unit It, which,
combined with the existing undepreciated capital stock, obtains aggregate capital in
the next period. The evolution of aggregate capital stock is given by:










where δ ∈ (0, 1) denotes the depreciation rate of capital and η
I
represents the cur-
vature of investment adjustment costs. Note that quadratic adjustment costs on
investment are introduced to motivate a variable price of capital, which is integral
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to set in motion the financial accelerator mechanism. Capital goods are then sold to
entrepreneurs at nominal price Qt, which is common to both types of entrepreneurs.
At period t, the representative capital goods producer maximizes the present






















where Λt denotes the marginal utility of nominal income for households at period t,
and thus βsΛt+s
Λt
represents households’ stochastic discount factor between period t



































from which the sequence of price of capital can be determined implicitly.
2.1.6 Households


















where the instantaneous utility at period t is defined over real consumption Ct (aug-




β ∈ (0, 1) denotes the discount factor, h ∈ (0, 1) governs the degree of habit forma-
33
tion, and η is the inverse of Frisch labor supply elasticity.
At period t, the household supplies labor services to P- and S-type firms at the
nominal wage rate Wt, after the realization of the aggregate productivity shock. It
can save by holding cash balance, Mc,t, a non-interest-bearing asset backed by the
government which issues it. Alternatively, he can choose to deposit funds with the
bankDt, which is risk-free in the sense that the bank has zero default risk in the model.
The bank deposit has a maturity of one period and pays a nominal gross rate of R
D,t
at the beginning of period t+1. The household’s end-of-period wealth is comprised of
gross returns from cash and deposits, wage incomes, real dividends from its ownership
of non-financial firms and producers, transfers from entrepreneurs, subtracting lump-
sum taxes paid to the government. Given its assets and current income, the household
allocates its resources between consumption as well as holdings of cash balance and
bank deposits. The flow budget constraint of the representative household can thus
be written as:
PtCt +Dt +Mc,t 6 RD,t−1Dt−1 +Mc,t−1 +WtHt + PtΘt − PtTt, (2.12)
where Θt and Tt denote net real transfers from firms and entrepreneurs, and real
lump-sum taxes (transfers for negative Tt), respectively.
As in the traditional money-in-utility specification (Sidrauski 1967), cash pays no
interest, and is held due to utility gains it generates for the household (e.g., transaction
services). By controlling the supply of cash in the economy, the government can adjust
the relative price of cash balance in terms of bank deposits, i.e., the nominal deposit
rate R
D,t
, and, due to price stickiness specified in subsection 2.1.4, can affect the real
interest rate and ultimately the real side of the economy.
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2.1.7 Banks
I capture the entire banking sector (including commercial and investment banks)
by assuming a representative, fully competitive bank. At period t, the bank takes
deposits from the representative household, Dt, as its only form of liabilities, sets a
part of them as reserves and lends out the rest, Bt, to fund two types of entrepreneurs.
Also, the bank holds a perfectly diversified portfolio of loans with a required return
rate of Rt. Hence the zero-profit condition requires:
RtBt +Re (Dt −Bt) = RD,tDt, (2.13)
where Re denotes the interest rate on bank reserves.
Also, the bank is required to hold a minimum fraction, τ , of reserves against its
deposits. Since Re is far less than the required rate on loans in the calibration, the
bank has no incentive to hold excess reserves, and thus we have:
Bt = (1− τ)Dt. (2.14)






As in Chang et al. (2019), the wedge between these two rates emerges from the
presence of the reserve requirement policy.
Also, similar to BGG and CMR (2014), the bank is a zero-risk operation which
does not undertake aggregate risks. As is shown in subsection 1.3.2 of Chapter 1,
this assumption naturally leads to the result that loan contracts, which are signed
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before the resolution of aggregate uncertainty, must be contingent on type-specific
and aggregate variables dependent on realization of aggregate shocks.
2.1.8 The Government
As specified in subsection 1.3.2, the government steps in and guarantees bank loans
made to entrepreneurs. In conformity with the reality in China, I postulate that loan
guarantees are only applicable to S-type entrepreneurs. Correspondingly, we have
λS ∈ (0, 1) while λP = 0.
Apart from providing loan guarantees to S-type entrepreneurs, the government
also implements monetary and fiscal policies. To coincide with the practice of China’s
monetary policy carried out by People’s Bank of China (PBoC), the country’s cen-
tral bank, over the past two decades, the intermediate target of monetary policy is
assumed to be the broad money supply, which includes cash in circulation plus bank
deposits, i.e.,
Mb,t = Mc,t +Dt. (2.16)
For simplicity, I assume that cash balance, Mc,t, is the only monetary policy tool the
government can utilize.
Following Sargent and Surico (2011) and Chen, Ren, and Zha (2018), the govern-


















is the steady-state growth rate of broad money, and GDP is the amount
of final goods net of monitoring costs. The feedback rule specified in (2.17) implies
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that the government smoothly adjusts the growth rate of broad money in response
to movements in deviations of inflation and GDP growth rate from their respective
steady-state levels5, where ψπ and ψy are feedback coefficients on inflation and GDP
growth rate, respectively, while ρm is the policy smoothing parameter.
Fiscal policy is characterized by real government consumption Gct , which is a
constant share gc of GDP in each period, i.e.,
Gct = g
c ·GDPt. (2.18)
Nominal costs associated with guarantees on loans to S-type entrepreneurs, along
with government consumption, are financed by lump-sum taxes as well as ’inflation
tax’ generated from new issuance of cash, both imposed on the representative house-






















can be derived by iterating one-period back in (1.8).
2.1.9 Resource Constraint and Equilibrium
The aggregate resource constraint is given by:
















5Real variables in the model do not have long-run trends, thus the steady-state gross rate of GDP
growth is 1.
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where the last term on the right-hand-side of the equation is the final goods used for
monitoring the defaulting entrepreneurs of both types. And the GDP can be defined
formally as:
GDPt = Ct + It +G
c
t . (2.21)
The usual definition of market equilibrium is adopted, under which various agents
maximize their objective functions and all markets clear. Market clearing conditions










































Clearing for the market of bank loans requires:





And the money market also clears due to Walras’ Law.
2.2 Allocative Efficiency
This section theoretically investigates how government guarantees on S-type firms,
in conjunction with financial frictions, potentially cause dispersion in MRPK and
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required rates of return on capital, which in turn gives rise to resource misallocation
and output losses. For convenience of analysis, price stickiness is deliberately omitted




t ), which can be justified by the consideration
that the efficiency loss from price dispersion does not show up in the first-order
approximation. Derivation of results in this section is detailed in Appendix B.2.
To assess the allocative efficiency of the economy, we need to define a measure
of efficient output, which is the maximum level of final goods conditional on given
amounts of capital and labor. As is shown in Appendix B.2, the efficient level of


















And the efficient output can be achieved only when inputs are allocated to P- and


























































respectively. Naturally, this allocation can be replicated in a frictionless economy, in
which the share of inputs used by the j-type (j ∈ {P,S}) representative firm equals
6In what follows, a tilde over a variable is used to indicate the socially optimal value of the
corresponding variable.
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However, with frictions on financing purchases of capital, the labor and capital allo-
cation is modified to:
Hjt
Ht















respectively, in which φjt denotes the MRPK of the j-type representative firm defined
in (2.5).
As is demonstrated intuitively in section 1.4 of Chapter 1, difference in degrees of
financial frictions owing to government guarantees on S-type firms creates heteroge-
neous capital choices across the two types of firms in response to exogenous shocks.
Hence, in the face of an adverse shock, the P-type firm slashes production to a greater
extent than its S-type counterpart, which, under my calibration, induces a drop (rise)
in sales share of P- (S-) type goods.8 This implies that the share of inputs allocated
to the P- (S-) type firm is smaller (larger) than optimal.
As can be observed by comparing (2.25) to (2.27), there is an additional force
pertaining to responses of φPt and φ
S
t which potentially distorts the allocation of capital
further away from socially efficient. The presence of government guarantees reduces
7It is often referred to as ’Domar weight’ in the literature.
8While this result is obvious when the economy is hit by an adverse risk shock, which resembles a
demand shock, it holds in the case of a negative technology shock only when P- and S-type outputs
are substitutes. More specifically, if the two types of goods are substitutable, a larger rise in P
P
t is
dominated by an even greater extent of output contraction of the P-type firm, leading to a reduction
(increase) in sPt (sSt ). Substitutability between two types of goods is consistent with my calibration
in subsection 2.3.1, which also coincides with the estimate by Chang, Liu, and Spiegel (2015).
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the default costs undertaken by S-type entrepreneurs, which essentially eases the
financial constraint faced by the representative S-type firm. Therefore, the response
of the required return on capital of the S-type firm (and also the external finance
premium) is also muted. However, the above effect is missing for the representative
P-type firm due to the absence of government support on loans to it. Since returns
on capital and MRPK are firmly related as shown in (1.1), differential responses
of the former should be reflected in the endogenous dispersion of the latter. More
specifically, as the P-type firm is more exposed to default risks, φPt is more responsive
to exogenous shocks than φSt , which further decreases (increases) the share of capital
allocated to the P- (S-) type firm. Consequently, the non-proportional movements in
required rates of return on capital and MRPK widen the gap between the equilibrium
and first-best allocations.
To further explore the relation between MRPK dispersion and the resulting losses
on aggregate TFP and output, I adopt the TFP accounting framework, which is com-
monly used in the misallocation literature (e.g., Hsieh and Klenow 2009; Gopinath et
al. 20179). As regards the representative j-type firm, the marginal revenue products
of capital and labor (both in nominal terms) are equal to φjt and Wt, respectively,

















Define TFPRt ≡ PtYtKαt H1−αt as the revenue-based total factor productivity of the final
9A similar framework is also used by Gilchrist, Sim, and Zakrajšek (2013) and Midrigan and Xu
(2014), in both of which a span-of-control production environment is assumed.
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Absent labor market frictions, the difference in revenue-based total factor productivity
between the two types of firms is completely attributed to the gap in returns on

































α can be broadly interpreted as the economy-wide
level of MRPK. Note that inserting φPt = φ
S
t = φt into (2.29) gives us the expression
of the TFP level when resources are allocated efficiently, which corresponds to the
efficient level of output as in (2.22). Intuitively, in a frictionless economy, capital and
labor are allocated depending on firms’ productivity levels and weights of firms in
the aggregate production function, which ensures that MRPK (and thus TFPR) are
equalized across the two types of firms. However, the efficient allocation of capital
is impeded by the heterogeneity in degrees of financial frictions faced by P- and S-
type firms, as reflected in a dispersion in returns on capital. In particular, due to
a stronger financial accelerator effect on the representative P-type firm, its required
return on capital is more sensitive to its financial position, leading to φPt > φ
S
t when
the economy is hit by an adverse shock. As can be seen from (2.29), when θ > 2 ,




t implies that the more productive P-type firm gains less weight in the production
of final output than is required by the social optimum. Consequently, the widening
gap in returns on capital across two types of firms elicits a misallocation effect, which
drives TFP further away from its first-best level and causes output losses.
2.3 Quantitative Analyses
2.3.1 Calibration
A model period is one quarter. Model parameters are partitioned into three sets.
The first set contains parameters associated with the real side of the economy, which
is the canonical part of my model. The second set consists of parameters pertinent
to two types of non-financial firms, and those determining financial frictions faced
by entrepreneurs managing these firms. The remaining parameters are related to
government policies. Regarding parameters which are calibrated to match steady-
state features of the economy, I compute the empirical moments over the 2000:I-
2015:IV period. The empirical counterparts of P- and S-type firms are POEs and
SOEs, respectively. My parameter choices are summarized in Table 1.1.
Most parameters in the first set are borrowed from DSGE literature on the Chinese
economy.10 I set the time discount factor to β = 0.9962, implying a steady-state
annual real interest rate of 1.5%. The degree of habit formation, h, and inverse labor
elasticity, η, are fixed at 0.6 and 1, respectively. Regarding parameters pertaining to
retailers, I assume that the elasticity of substitution among retail goods and Calvo
parameter are ε = 10 and κ = 0.85, respectively, so that the steady-state markup is
1.11, and retailers reoptimize prices once every 6.67 quarters on average. The capital
10These papers include, but are not limited to, Zhang (2009), Li and Liu (2017), Guo, Jiang, and




β Households’ discount factor 0.996
h Habit formation 0.6
η Inverse Frisch labor elasticity 1
ε Elasticity of substitution among retail goods 10
κ Calvo price stickiness 0.85
δ Capital depreciation rate 0.025
ηI Curvature of investment adjustment costs 2
Non-Financial Firms and Entrepreneurs
α Capital elasticity of output 0.5
A
S Steady-state productivity of S-type firms 1
A
P Steady-state productivity of P-type firms 2.25
θ Elasticity of substitution between P and S goods 2.5
ς Proportion of P-type firms 0.55
µ Monitoring costs 0.25
σ Steady-state s.d. of idiosyncratic shocks 0.67
λP Guarantees to P-type entrepreneurs 0
λS Guarantees to S-type entrepreneurs 0.58
γ Survival probability of entrepreneurs 0.94
W e Transfer to new entrepreneurs 0.009
ρA Autocorrelation of productivity shock 0.9
σA Standard deviation of productivity shock 0.016
ρσ Autocorrelation of risk shock 0.8
σσ Standard deviation of risk shock 0.022
The Government
τ Reserve requirement ratio 0.15
Re Interest rate on reserves 1
Π Steady-state inflation rate 1.005
ρm Monetary policy smoothing parameter 0.39
ψπ Policy weight on inflation -0.65
ψy Policy weight on GDP growth rate 0.30
gc Government spending to output ratio 0.15
Table 2.1: Calibrated Values
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depreciation rate is δ = 0.025, in line with the estimate of Bai, Hsieh, and Qian
(2006), and the curvature of investment adjustment costs is set to ηI = 2.
The second set of parameters is tied to two types of non-financial firms and en-
trepreneurs. The capital share in the production function equals α = 0.5, a value
commonly used in the literature on Chinese economy following Bai, Hsieh, and Qian
(2006). In regard to productivity difference between P- and S-type firms, I normalize
A
S
= 1 and set AP = 2.25, which implies a TFP ratio of 1.5 between POEs and
SOEs consistent with the estimate by Hsieh and Song (2015) and Bai, Hsieh, and
Song (2016).11 The parameter governing the elasticity of substitution between P and
S goods is fixed at θ = 2.5. Within the range of 1.92-4.53, which Chang, Liu, and
Spiegel (2015) argue as empirically plausible, I choose a conservative value in the
sense that the misallocation effect is not overstated.12 The weight of P-type goods in
the production of intermediate goods, ς, is calibrated so that the steady-state share of














, equals 0.63, in conformity with its observed
counterpart. There is little guidance in selecting the bankruptcy cost parameter, µ,
regarding the Chinese economy, and I assume µ = 0.25, which lies within the range
of values 0.2-0.36 documented by Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997). As in the subsection
2.1.8, I set the fraction of losses on loans to P-type entrepreneurs covered by the
government to λP = 0. The steady-state standard deviation of idiosyncratic shocks,
σ, and the parameter pertaining to the government guarantees on bank loans to S-
type firms, λS, are jointly determined to match the steady-state leverages of POEs
and SOEs, which are 2.33 and 2.48, respectively, over the sample period. The re-
sulting calibrated values are σ = 0.67 and λS = 0.79. Note that the choice of σ is
11Their results are conservative relative to other papers in the literature. For example, Brandt,
Hsieh, and Zhu (2008), Brandt and Zhu (2010), and Liu, Wang, and Xu (2019) report estimates of
1.8, 2.3, and 1.9, respectively.
12Main quantitative results of this paper, however, are robust to the choice of θ.
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close to the standard deviation of revenue productivity across Chinese manufacturing
firms estimated by Hsieh and Klenow (2009). Following the firm-level evidence of
Brandt, Van Biesebroeck, and Zhang (2012), the entrepreneurial survival rate is set
to γ = 0.94, which enables me to solve for households’ transfer to new entrepreneurs,
W e. Both shocks considered in this paper originate in entrepreneurial and corporate
sectors. Loosely following the Bayesian estimation results of Li and Liu (2017) and
Li and Luo (2019), the persistence of standard deviation of technology shocks are set
to ρA = 0.90 and σA = 0.016, respectively, while the risk shock parameters equal to
ρσ = 0.80 and σσ = 0.022.
Finally, parameters related to monetary and fiscal policies are considered. Follow-
ing Chang et al. (2019), I normalize the interest rate on reserves to Re = 1, and fix
the reserve requirement ratio at τ = 0.15. The steady-state gross inflation rate, Π, is
set so that the annual net inflation rate is 2%. Parameters governing the monetary
policy rule are assigned values following the estimate reported by Chen, Ren, and Zha
(2018). The policy smoothing parameter is set to ρm = 0.39, while the reaction coef-
ficients are ψπ = −0.65 and ψy = 0.30, respectively.13 Note that the positive sign of
ψy is reconciled with the PBoC’s practice of adjusting broad money supply to accom-
modate output growth. However, the model determinacy still holds, as the implied
risk-free interest rate rule satisfies the Taylor principle under my parametrization.
Regarding the fiscal policy, gc is set so that the share of government consumption in
GDP is 0.15 in the steady state, consistent with the sample mean of the data.
13These chosen parameters imply that feedback parameters of broad money supply to inflation








= 0.183, respectively, which coincide with
estimates in Chen, Ren, and Zha (2018).
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2.3.2 Impulse Responses
This subsection discusses impulse responses of selected variables to negative risk and
technology shocks, respectively. In both cases, solid lines show the responses of the
baseline model, while dotted lines give the responses of a variant of model in which
government guarantees are removed by setting λS = 0. In both figures exhibited
below, variables shown from panels A to F are displayed as percentage deviations from
their respective steady-state values; difference in excess returns on capital between
P- and S- types of firms is annualized; output losses at period t are defined as Ỹt−Yt,
which is then normalized in terms of the corresponding steady-state output.
The model’s response to a contractionary risk shock of one standard deviation is
depicted in Figure 2.2. In both versions of the model, an adverse risk shock leads
to noticeable drops in real GDP, hours worked, investment, and the price of capital,
as shown from panels A to D. Dynamics of these variables are broadly consistent
with those implied by the financial accelerator logic as in CMR (2010, 2014). More
specifically, an increase in risk raises the likelihood of entrepreneurs falling into the
default region. The bank then transfers the ensuing increase in monitoring costs
incurred to entrepreneurs by charging a higher loan spread, which causes reduction
in entrepreneurial borrowing and investment. The resulting fall in the price of capital
(and a corresponding increase in the economy-wide external finance premium not
shown here) and net worth triggers a financial accelerator mechanism, via which the
impacts of the risk shock are amplified and propagated.
The distinctive feature of my analysis lies in the inclusion of partial government
guarantees to one subset of non-financial firms (i.e., S-type firms) which, combined
with financial frictions, can generate two offsetting effects on macroeconomic volatil-
ity. First, government guarantees help both types of firms buffer against the amplified
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Figure 2.2: Impulse Responses to an Adverse Risk Shock
impact of the risk shock stemming from the financial accelerator mechanism stated
above. The dampened response of S-type variables is a direct logical result of the fact
that, by providing guarantees on loans to S-type firms, the government eases their
financial constraints, which reduces fluctuations of their investment and production
relative to the case without government guarantees (panel F of Figure 2.2). Mean-
while, the attenuated drop in the investment demand of S-type firms cushions the
downward movement in the price of capital (panel D), and thus mutes the effect of
the financial accelerator mechanism on P-type firms. Note that the positive spillover
effect on stabilizing P-type firms’ activity stems from the concomitant general equi-
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librium price effect,14 and hinges on the assumption that capital is homogeneous and
can be allocated easily across both types of firms. As is clearly evident in panels B
and C, government guarantees restrain the impacts of the negative risk shock on both
total hours worked and aggregate investment.
Although the effect stated above can at least partially explain the intention of gov-
ernment guarantees,15 it does not tell the whole story: the additional misallocation
effect created by government guarantees to S-type firms can counteract the stabilizing
effect and lead to an even larger GDP volatility. Specifically, while excess returns on
capital (or equivalently external finance premia), defined as the spread between the
required rates of return on capital and on bank loans, faced by both P- and S-type
firms widen upon impact, the response is more pronounced for P-type firms, as high-
lighted by an apparently increased difference in excess returns on capital between two








, in panel G. This is intuitive considering
that government guarantees reduce the fraction of loan losses which ultimately has to
be borne by S-type entrepreneurs/firms, and thus dampen the increase in the excess
return on capital of S-type firms. The asymmetric movements in excess returns on
capital are related to a heightened dispersion in MRPK which, as was made clear
above, disrupts an efficient allocation of capital and hampers aggregate TFP. In par-
ticular, the share of capital allocated to P-type firms deviates further from the level
required than socially optimum, leaving these firms disproportionately hurt compared
to their S-type counterparts in response to an adverse risk shock (panels E and F). As
14A higher price of capital can potentially impede the adjustment along extensive margin and
reduce the number of firms in production. Without an explicit modeling of endogenous entry and
exit, this mechanism is absent in this paper. See Jo and Senga (2019) for a discussion on this issue.
15As I mentioned briefly in the introduction, some policies are enacted by the Chinese government
for the sake of achieving political goals. Among others, low unemployment rate is the top priority due
to its strong connection with social stability. From this perspective, the success along the dimension
of stabilizing hours worked, a natural proxy of employment in my model, can motivate the Chinese
government to keep providing guarantees to SOEs.
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I elaborate by adopting the TFP accounting framework of Hsieh and Klenow (2009)
in the previous section, a larger share of capital allocation from more productive P-
type firms to less productive S-type ones further distorts the allocative efficiency and
causes output losses (panel H). Under my parametrization, the misallocation effect
becomes the dominant force in the overall impact of government guarantees, which
amplify and propagate the impact of a negative risk shock on GDP relative to the
situation absent government guarantees. At the first glance, the higher cyclicality of
GDP may be at odds with stabilized hours worked and aggregate investment. How-
ever, this prima facie counterintuitive result can again be explained by the resource
misallocation effect. In particular, while government guarantees restrict the reduction
in hours worked and investment, the supported demand for input resources are largely
absorbed by less constrained while less productive S-type firms. As is detailed in the
previous section, this resource allocation process crowds out high-productivity P-type
firms, forcing them to slash their production further away from the socially optimal
level. Consequently, the stabilized demand for production inputs is outweighed by
the distortion in resource allocation, which further drives GDP down. As mentioned
in Section 1.2 of Chapter 1, there is a growing literature documenting the distinctive
pattern of the Chinese economy after its government carried out a credit stimulus
plan during 2009-2010, which was significantly biased towards SOEs, to withstand
the impact of the global financial crisis. Specifically, despite its success in prevent-
ing massive unemployment and a plunge in aggregate demand, the credit expansion
program is considered to have sowed the seeds for a decrease in allocative efficiency
and a slowdown in TFP growth since its implementation (e.g., Bai, Hsieh, and Song
2016; Sun 2018; Cong et al. 2019). Viewed through the lens of my model, this empir-
ical regularity can be reckoned as a natural consequence of the increased government
support by granting SOEs preferential access to bank credit, which turns out to be
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counterproductive in smoothing GDP fluctuations.
It is noteworthy to point out one implication of quantitative results displayed
above for macroeconomic impacts of risk shocks, which can be broadly interpreted
as second-moment shocks. As mentioned earlier, the key transmission mechanism of
risk shocks in my model is closely related to that in CMR (2010, 2014).16 However,
this paper also hints at an additional conduit via which risk shocks can affect the
economy. In particular, a jump in risk tends to reallocate credit and capital away
from firms with larger exposures to the heightened uncertainty while with higher
productivity (P-type firms in this model) towards firms with the opposite features (S-
type firms), which further depresses aggregate TFP based on the mechanism shown
above. While the ’flight-to-quality’ dynamics in resource allocation, along with their
aggregate effects, are highlighted in my model with an explicit connection to the
Chinese economy, it is also worthwhile to explore whether this channel can apply to
more general models featuring firms with financial heterogeneity (e.g., Ottonello and
Winberry 2019) outside the context of China.17
Figure 2.3 displays impulse responses of the same set of variables to a contrac-
tionary technology shock of one standard deviation. Key economic driving forces
underlying the reactions of these variables are qualitatively similar to the case of a
negative risk shock. However, the difference between responses of the baseline model
and its variant without government guarantees is at best modest, as opposed to the
model’s responses to a risk shock. This is clear evidence that both channels via which
government guarantees influence the economy and their overall impact on aggregate
volatility strongly depend on the strength of the financial accelerator mechanism in
16Note that without irreversibility of investment, the ’wait-and-see’ effect emphasized by Bloom
(2009) does not show up in the model.
17A theoretical model relating capital misallocation to firms’ exposures to investment risks is
provided in David, Schmid, and Zeke (2019).
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Figure 2.3: Impulse Responses to an Adverse Productivity Shock
operation. In response to a negative technology shock, leverages of both types of firms
first rise and then decline. Deleveraging of firms then drives down their external fi-
nance premia and restricts the extent of shrinkage in corporate balance sheets. These
in turn limit the macroeconomic impact of the financial accelerator mechanism. More-
over, as argued by De Graeve (2008), the presence of investment adjustment costs
further attenuates the impact of temporary fluctuations in the external finance pre-
mium.18 Since the financial accelerator mechanism only operates moderately in the
technology-induced recession, both stabilizing and misallocation effects that emerge
18This stands in contrast to capital adjustment costs adopted by BGG, in which the financial
accelerator mechanism works conspicuously in response to technology shocks.
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from government guarantees are quantitatively limited as evidenced by comparison
of responses in Figure 2.3.
2.4 Conclusion
Motivated by empirical regularities relating government guarantees to capital misal-
location and the recent economic slowdown in China, this paper develops a tractable
general equilibrium model to assess macroeconomic effects of partial loan guarantees
to SOEs enacted by the government. By essentially easing their financial constraints,
government guarantees dampen responses of investment and production of SOEs dur-
ing recessions and attenuates the downward pressure on the price of capital; the latter
effect provides a positive spillover on POEs by muting the impact of the financial ac-
celerator mechanism on them. However, the positive effect of government guarantees
on stabilizing macroeconomic fluctuations are offset by their impact on capital mis-
allocation. By inducing a dispersion in returns on capital across POEs and SOEs,
and in particular the capital allocation to SOEs with lower productivity and marginal
products, government guarantees can exert detrimental impacts on the allocative effi-
ciency of resources and thus cause further TFP and output losses, driving down GDP
to a larger degree during economic downturns. To quantitatively evaluate these two
effects, I calibrate a full-fledged DSGE model augmented with the BGG-type financial
accelerator mechanism to the Chinese economy. Impulse responses of main macroe-
conomic variables indicate that, while the stabilizing effect is reflected by responses
of total hours worked and aggregate investment, it is dominated by the capital misal-
location effect in determining the overall influence of government guarantees on GDP
fluctuations, making partial loan guarantees to SOEs counterproductive in moder-
ating GDP reactions to both risk and technology shocks. Both channels via which
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government guarantees affect macroeconomic volatility, along with their net impacts,
are pronounced in the model’s response to a negative risk shock. However, effects of
government guarantees are fairly modest in technology-driven business cycles, a clear
indication that the quantitative significance of government guarantees relies strongly
on the strength of the financial accelerator mechanism in operation.
As in BGG and CMR (2010, 2014), financial intermediaries are treated as a veil in
this paper. However, due to an underdeveloped capital market, bank loans remains
the most crucial source of external finance for most the majority of firms in China.
Therefore, financial constraints on the banking sector, as well as their impacts on
banks’ portfolio management over the business cycles, play a non-negligible role in
determining the volume of credit extended to POEs and SOEs. In this regard, allow-
ing a richer description of financial intermediaries in the model would tend to affect
the magnitude of capital misallocation and the resulting business cycle fluctuations.
I leave this extension to future works.
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Chapter 3
The Procyclical Effect of Risk-Based Capital Requirement: A DSGE Ap-
proach
3.1 Introduction
To enhance the safety and stability of the international banking system and promote
the quality of banking supervision, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
(BCBS) has issued a series of regulatory frameworks, notably known as Basel Accords,
to ensure that financial intermediaries have sufficient capital to withstand unexpected
losses. Specifically, Basel Accords require banks to hold a minimum amount of capital
relative to their total risk-weighted assets. Under the 1988 Basel Accord known as
Basel I (BCBS 1988), bank assets are classified into five categories,1 and assets within
the same category are assigned an identical risk weight regardless of their respective
credit qualities. To tackle some major shortcomings of Basel I, such as the scope
for regulatory arbitrage and its insufficient sensitivity to banks’ portfolio risks, the
BCBS approved a revised version of the Basel Accord (BCBS 2004), often referred
to as Basel II. Its crucial modification relative to Basel I is that the new accord
obliges banks to determine the risk weight attached to each asset on book based on
its corresponding risk properties, such as its default rate and loss given default, while
risk weight calculation based on Basel I is comparably risk-insensitive. Under Basel
1According to BCBS (1988), assets are divided into five categories based on risks weights as
follows: 0%, 10%, 20%, 50%, and 100%. However, when Basel I was implemented in the US, only
four levels of risk weights (0%, 20%, 50%, and 100%) are specified.
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II, assets with higher perceived risks are associated with higher risk weights, hence
the capital requirement imposed on banks will be tightened in response to increased
risks of their underlying assets.
While Basel II is motivated by the need to discourage excessive risk taking by
financial intermediaries and decrease the probability of bank failures during economic
downturns, it has also raised the concern that it can potentially exacerbate procycli-
cal tendencies of financial markets and the real economy. The logic of this concern
builds on the intuition that, risk weights assigned to bank loans often go hand in hand
with the corresponding credit risks, which are typically countercyclical. Specifically,
during economic booms, risk weights are lower thanks to a reduced chance of default,
which equivalently eases the capital requirement and incentivizes banks to expand
their lending activities. In bad times, however, banks are more likely to suffer from
losses on their balance sheets, while simultaneously the risk-based capital require-
ment à la Basel II becomes more stringent. If banks have difficulty raising outside
equity, they are forced to cut their lending, which can give rise to a credit crunch.
The reinforced cyclicality in the supply of bank credit generated by variations in risk
weights can be transmitted to the real economy and amplify aggregate fluctuations.
The degree of additional procyclicality attributed to the implementation of Basel II
has been at the top of the agenda for bank regulators for the past decade. However,
full-blown general equilibrium models which enable us to quantitatively evaluate the
cyclical effect of the risk-based capital requirement are surprisingly rare. In contrast,
most studies regarding the cyclicality of Basel II provide reduced-form or partial
equilibrium explanations of mechanisms through which Basel II can impose tighter
capital requirements during economic contractions. While these models provide im-
portant insights, they are primarily aimed at illustrating theoretical mechanisms and
are mainly qualitative.
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The paper takes one step towards filling the gap in the literature. I propose a dy-
namic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with financial frictions featuring
an explicit characterization of the Basel-style bank capital requirement. In the model,
frictions on both demand and supply sides of bank credit coexist and interact. Rather
than modeling the banking sector as the equity holder of non-financial firms and im-
plicitly ignoring frictions that impede credit flows between corporate and banking
sectors as in, e.g., Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) and Gertler and Karadi (2011), the
bank lending in this paper takes the form of debt-like loans. This setup allows me to
separate out balance sheets of these two sectors, and introduce frictions in corporate
demand for bank credit by adopting the costly state verification (CSV) framework
as in Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999, BGG hereafter). Compared to alter-
native modeling approaches commonly used in the macro-finance literature (e.g., en-
forcement or collateral constraints as in Kiyotaki and Moore 1997 and Jermann and
Quadrini 2012), the CSV framework enables me to endogenize the entrepreneurial
default probability on bank loans, which is crucial to distinguish between the two
versions of Basel Accords. The modification of Basel II against Basel I largely lies
in the adjustment of risk weight calculation on bank assets (and the corresponding
risk-weighted assets), which, under Basel II, largely determines risk weights based
on the default probability of corresponding assets. Therefore, apart from the classic
financial accelerator mechanism à la BGG, the endogenous determination of default
risks activates an additional channel via which the implementation of Basel II can po-
tentially alter the volatility of the credit market, which then feeds back into aggregate
fluctuations. Also, following Zhang (2010), Benes and Kumhof (2015), and Rannen-
berg (2016), I modify the timing and contingency of financial contracts by assuming
that the bank lending rate in the financial contract can only be specified conditional
on aggregate variables before the realization of current-period shocks. Accordingly,
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banks have to undertake part of credit risks, which highlights the role of bank equity
in absorbing loan losses.
Under a reasonably calibrated model, I study the dynamic responses of the econ-
omy to three stochastic shocks: a shock to the cross-sectional dispersion of en-
trepreneurial idiosyncratic uncertainty, referred to as a risk shock and categorized
as a financial shock in this paper, a shock to the total factor productivity (TFP) in
the production function, and a shock to the marginal efficiency of investment (MEI for
short). My quantitative analyses show that, when the economy is hit by shocks under
which output and the soundness of entrepreneurial and bank balance sheets change
in the same direction (risk and TFP shocks), Basel II manifests procyclicality in the
sense that it increases the volatility of the credit market and the macroeconomy; in
contrast, when the economy is subject a shock which moves output and the strength
of balance sheet conditions in the opposite directions (a MEI shock), the inclusion of
Basel II stabilizes the economy relative to the case under the risk-insensitive Basel I.
Also, while the implementation of Basel II can generate a discernible cyclical effect
under a financial shock, which causes a non-trivial deterioration of equity positions
in the entrepreneurial and banking sectors, shocks directly influencing the real side
of the economy without conspicuously affecting the entrepreneurial defaults fail to
produce a perceptible difference between magnitudes of fluctuations under Basel I
and Basel II.
While intuitively straightforward, my quantitative results have crucial implications
for the design of macroprudential policies. First, since the direction and magnitude
of cyclical effects which emerge from the Basel II-type risk-based capital requirement
are highly associated with the nature of macroeconomic shocks, it is necessary for
policy-makers to identify the source of shocks so as to develop policies which can
appropriately address procyclicality issues. Second, considering that Basel II is moti-
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vated to promote stability of the banking system, the accompanying procyclical effect
induces a tradeoff between financial and macroeconomic stabilization, which tends to
worsen when the economy is subject to a financial shock. While my model framework
abstracts from the concern of systematic risks in the banking sector, this tradeoff can
be potentially important in the practice of macroprudential policy making.
Outline The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the
related literature. Section 3.3 develops the DSGE model and discusses the model
setup. Section 3.4 calibrates the model parameters. Section 3.5 reports main results
of quantitative analyses. Section 3.6 concludes and suggests directions for future
research.
3.2 Related Literature
This paper is related to the literature which evaluates the macroeconomic impacts
of different regulatory regimes.2 Most importantly, this paper contributes to studies
regarding cyclical effects of the Basel II-type risk-based capital requirement. The
majority of this strand of literature either is qualitative in nature (e.g., Kashyap and
Stein 2004; Heid 2007; Boissay and Kok Sørensen 2009) or imposes simplified assump-
tions on macroeconomic equilibria (e.g., Repullo and Suarez 2004, 2013; Gordy and
Howells 2006; Andersen 2011), and thus does not allow us to quantitatively explore
the macroeconomic effects of introducing Basel II. There are a few exceptions which
explicitly embed financial constraints on non-financial firms and banks into general
equilibrium models, and compare the influence of different regulatory regimes. Among
others, Angelini, Neri, and Panetta (2014), Falagiarda and Saia (2017) and Gam-
2Apart from the papers cited in this paragraph, contributions in this strand of literature also
include, e.g., Benes and Kumhof (2015), Nyugen (2015), Elenev, Landvoigt, and Van Nieuwerburgh
(2018), Mendicino, et al. (2018), and Begenau (forthcoming).
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bacorta and Karmakar (2018) develop DSGE models which incorporate risk-based
regulation as in Basel II, by directly relating risk weights of bank loans to macroe-
conomic variables (e.g., real output). This simplified reduced-form specification of
the determination of risk weights, while maintaining parsimony, are not well suited
to assess the quantitative significance of cyclical effects emerging from Basel II under
various types of shocks.3 The modeling approach of Darracq Paries, Kok Sørensen,
and Rodriguez-Palenzuela (2011) is closest to this paper. However, while they focus
on the allocation of bank credit between households and non-financial firms, my paper
emphasizes the role of Basel II in altering the volatility of credit supply and, more
broadly, in magnifying or mitigating macroeconomic fluctuations.
This paper also follows a large body of literature that explores business cycle im-
plications of deterioration in banks’ balance sheets and bank capital requirements.
In these papers, the procyclicality of bank capital takes the center stage in shap-
ing spillover effects from the banking sector to the real economy, due to its pivotal
role in the determination of bank lending capacity and loan-deposit spread. Papers
in this tradition include, but not limited to, Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), Meh and
Moran (2010), Gertler and Karadi (2011), Iacoviello (2014), Ajello (2016), Rannen-
berg (2016), and Nuño and Thomas (2017). This paper is complementary to these
works in the sense that it integrates the characterization of Basel-like regulatory
frameworks, which is closer to the actual implementation of Basel Accords, into a
tractable DSGE setting, which enables me to evaluate the cyclical impact of Basel II
on the macroeconomy in comparison to the risk-insensitive Basel I regime.
3I closely follow Agénor, Alper, and Pereira da Silva (2012) by formulating the risk weight assigned
to bank loans as a function of entrepreneurial default probability. However, in their paper, the default




I consider a discrete-time infinite-horizon DSGE model. This economy features seven
types of agents: households, capital producers, intermediate goods producers, final
goods producers, entrepreneurs, banks and the government. This section discusses
the model and characterizes the behavior of each sector. Subsections 2.1-2.3 present
the real side of the economy, which is fairly standard.4 Subsections 2.4 and 2.5 de-
scribe the financial side of the model, which is composed of entrepreneurs’ and banks’
problems. As in BGG, the CSV framework is embedded to motivate a standard debt
contract between these two parties, with a slight modification of timing assumption.
Also, banks are subject to the regulatory capital constraint, formalized to nest both
scenarios of Basel I and II. Finally, I present monetary and fiscal policy rules, and
give an account of the resource constraint to close the model. Derivation of optimality
conditions of various agents is relegated to Appendix C for brevity.
3.3.1 Households







, where β ∈ (0, 1) denotes the discount factor, and the instantaneous
utility function at period t, defined over consumption, Ct (augmented with habit
formation), and hours worked, Ht, is given by:




4These parts of model closely follow the standard DSGE literature (e.g., Christiano, Eichenbaum,
and Evans 2005; Smets and Wouters 2007; Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti 2010), but are still
included to ensure that the model presentation is self-contained.
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where h ∈ (0, 1) represents the degree of habit formation, % governs the weight of
labor disutility in the instantaneous utility function, and η is the inverse of Frisch
labor supply elasticity.
The representative household can save by depositing funds with banks and by
buying nominal government bonds, both of which have a maturity of one period.
Also, both of these two assets are risk-free in nominal terms, and are thus perfect
substitutes. The total amount of financial wealth at the end of period t is denoted
as Mt, with a nominal gross rate of Rt paid at the beginning of period t + 1. The
household allocates its after-tax funds to consumption and financial assets. Its sources
of funds are earnings from labor and interest payment from assets, dividends from
its ownership of producers, and transfers from entrepreneurs and banks. The budget
constraint of the household is given as:
PtCt +Mt 6 Rt−1Mt−1 +WtHt + Pt∆t − PtTt, (3.1)
with Pt denoting the aggregate price level, Wt indicating the nominal wage, ∆t and
Tt denoting net real transfers from firms and entrepreneurs, and real lump-sum taxes
(transfers for negative Tt), respectively.
3.3.2 Capital Goods Producers
At period t, a representative capital goods producer purchases a fraction of final goods
at price Pt and transforms them into investment goods of unit It, which, combined
with the existing undepreciated capital stock, obtains aggregate capital of period t+1.
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The aggregate stock of raw capital evolves according to:











where δ ∈ (0, 1) denotes the depreciation rate of capital. Note that production of raw
capital goods is subject to quadratic investment adjustment costs, with η
I
indicating
the corresponding curvature. I introduce a shock to the marginal efficiency of invest-
ment (MEI shock henceforth), which affects the process of transforming investment
into raw capital , denoted as ζI,t in (3.2). As argued by the recent DSGE literature
(e.g., Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti 2010, 2011), the MEI shock has played
a pivotal role in driving U.S. business cycles. This shock is assumed to follow the
stochastic process:
lnζI,t = ρI lnζI,t−1 + εI,t, (3.3)
with εI,t following an i.i.d. normal distribution N (0, σ2I ). Capital goods are then
sold to entrepreneurs at a nominal price Qt. Note that the inclusion of investment
adjustment costs can also motivate a time-varying price of capital, which is essential
to set the financial accelerator mechanism in motion.5
Since the capital goods producer is ultimately owned by the representative house-
hold, the latter’s stochastic discount factor applies to the optimization problem of the
former. Therefore, the representative capital goods producer maximizes the present
5BGG introduce capital adjustment costs to generate a variation in the price of capital and to
make the financial accelerator effect operative. Here I follow the tradition of medium-scale DSGE
models (e.g, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans 2005; Smets and Wouters 2007) and adopt the
investment adjustment costs instead, primarily due to the empirical fact that the latter is more
strongly supported by VAR evidence.
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where Λt is the marginal utility of nominal income for the household, and thus βsΛt+sΛt
indicates its stochastic discount factor between period t and t + s. The optimality










































3.3.3 Final and Intermediate Goods Producers
A representative, perfectly competitive final goods producer assembles a continuum











where ε > 1 denotes the elasticity of substitution across varieties of intermediate
goods. The single final good is taken as numeraire.
A typical intermediate goods producer, indexed j, acts as a monopolistic competi-








where Pj,t is the price of retail good of type j, Pt is the price of the final good and
hence indicates the aggregate price level. The intermediate goods producer rents
capital, Kj,t, at a rental rate of rkt from entrepreneurs and hires labor service, Hj,t, at
the wage ofWt from households, both of which are represented in nominal terms, and






where lnAt represents a transitory shock on total factor productivity (TFP), following
a stationary AR(1) process:
lnAt = ρalnAt−1 + εa,t, (3.7)
where εa,t is i.i.d.∼ N (0, σ2a).
Price setting of intermediate goods producers is subject to the Calvo-style nominal
rigidity: each period only a portion 1 − κ of producers are allowed to adjust their
prices optimally, while the complementary fraction reset prices by indexing them to
the steady-state inflation rate. Therefore, for a proportion κ of intermediate goods
producers, prices are set according to:
Pj,t = Pj,t−1Π, (3.8)
where we denote the gross inflation rate at period t as Πt ≡ PtPt−1 , with its steady-
state value indicated by Π. The rest of intermediate goods producers being able to
reoptimize set their prices identically at P̃t. The law of motion of aggregate price
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Similar to BGG and CMR (2010, 2014), my assumptions regarding the entrepreneurial
sector closely follow the CSV framework. In particular, entrepreneurs finance their
purchases of capital by taking bank loans in the form of defaultable debt claims. Only
entrepreneurs can costlessly observe idiosyncratic shocks to their own returns on cap-
ital; entrepreneurs with sufficiently low realized shocks relative to their nominal debt
obligations will default and declare bankruptcy. As the lender, banks pay monitor-
ing costs when taking over the defaulting entrepreneurs. The CSV framework allows
me to endogenize entrepreneurial default on bank loans, which plays an instrumental
role in the analysis of different regimes of capital requirement imposed on the banking
sector in the subsequent subsection.
A typical entrepreneur purchases raw capital from the representative capital goods
producer, and turns them into capital readily usable for production of intermediate
goods. Specifically, at the end of period t, the entrepreneur indexed i acquires capital
Ki,t+1 from the capital goods producer at a nominal price Qt and rents them to
intermediate goods producers for their production at period t + 1 at the rate rkt+1.
Undepreciated capital is sold back to the capital goods producer, and the average
nominal return on capital across entrepreneurs realized at period t+ 1 is given by:
Rkt+1 ≡




After production occurs, the entrepreneur i experiences an idiosyncratic shock ωi,t+1,
which converts her nominal return on capital into ωi,t+1Rkt+1. The random vari-
able, ωt+1, is a log-normal variable distributed independently across entrepreneurs,
which summarizes the idiosyncratic component of business risks and creates ex-post
heterogeneity among entrepreneurs. The cumulative distribution function of ωt+1
is Ψt+1 (x) ≡ Pr (ωt+1 ≤ x) , and the corresponding density function is denoted as
ψt+1 (x). Also we normalize Et (ωt+1) = 1 and denote V ar (ln (ωt+1)) = (σt+1)
2. Here
I assume that the standard deviation σt+1 fluctuates stochastically over time and
follows an exogenous AR(1) process:
lnσt+1 = (1− ρσ) lnσ̄ + ρσlnσt + εσ,t+1, (3.10)
with ρσ ∈ (0, 1) denoting the persistence of the shock, σ̄ the steady-state value of
σt+1, and εσ,t+1 is an i.i.d. shock with εσ,t+1 ∼ N (0, σ2σ). Following the terminology
of CMR (2014), this shock process is referred to as a risk shock. Note that the risk
shock affects the probability of entrepreneurial default on bank loans and thus the
amount of bank credit towards entrepreneurs; besides, as will be detailed below, the
risk shock can exert direct impact on equity positions of entrepreneurs and banks,
thereby influencing the strength of balance sheets of these two sectors. In this sense,
the risk shock can be interpreted as a financial shock.
Now I can characterize the financial contract between entrepreneur i and the
corresponding bank. Entrepreneur i finances his acquisition of the capital stock
QtKi,t+1 using her end-of-period-t net worth N ei,t and a bank loan of the amount
Bi,t = QtKi,t+1 −N ei,t, which is repaid in period t + 1. Following the standard result
in Townsend (1979), the optimal loan agreement takes the form of a standard debt
contract. In particular, each entrepreneur agrees on a debt contract with the bank,
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specifying a loan amount Bi,t and a nominal contractual repayment rate Zt, the latter
of which is common across all entrepreneurs. Importantly, different from BGG and
CMR (2010, 2014), in which a schedule of loan rates can be set contingent on the
realization of aggregate variables at period t+ 1, I closely follow Zhang (2010), Benes
and Kumhof (2015), and Rannenberg (2016) by assuming that Zt is predetermined at
the end of period t before the resolution of aggregate uncertainty at period t+ 1. As
will become clear below, this modification exposes banks to aggregate risks: in face of
a default rate higher than expected, banks need to use their net worth to absorb the
resulting losses. Corresponding to the realization of Rkt+1 at period t+ 1, there exists
a cutoff value ωi,t+1, which is the minimum realized value of idiosyncratic shock such
that entrepreneur i is able to fully repay the principal and interest, defined by:
ωi,t+1R
k
t+1QtKi,t+1 = ZtBi,t. (3.11)
Entrepreneur i defaults if ωi,t+1 < ωi,t+1; in the event of default, the bank monitors
and seizes the entrepreneur’s asset with a nominal value of ωi,t+1Rkt+1QtKt+1, but has
to pay a fraction µ as monitoring costs.
At the end of period t, the expected revenues received by banks from the loan
contract (Bi,t, Zt) is given by:









This expression can be divided into two parts. The first term corresponds to the
bank’s revenues collected from subgroup of entrepreneurs who are able to repay their
loan at the pre-committed lending rate, with an expected mass of 1−Et [Ψt+1 (ωi,t+1)],
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while the second term indicates revenues received from defaulting entrepreneurs (net
of monitoring costs). Hence the participation constraint for banks is given as follows:













where Rbt+1 is the required rate of return on the perfectly diversified loan portfolio
to entrepreneurs held by banks (net of costs associated with entrepreneurial default).
As will be shown in the next subsection, the required rate of return on bank loans,
which is associated with supply of funds from the banking sector, is affected by the
capital requirement imposed on banks regarding their ability to obtain deposits from
households. Also, free entry implies that (3.13) must hold as strict equality.
It is worth noting a caveat with regard to the difference between the timing and
contingency of the contractual obligation described above and those in BGG and CMR
(2010, 2014). In the latter’s setting, banks are assumed to be ’pass-through’ financial
intermediaries with zero risk and zero net worth under all possible realizations of
future outcomes, while entrepreneurs bear all aggregate risks. This assumption is
self-consistent only when the loan rate (and the corresponding cutoff value) can be
drawn up contingent on the realization of Rkt+1. In particular, an unexpected low
realized Rkt+1 raises the fraction of defaulting entrepreneurs, and the loan rate moves
up correspondingly to compensate the banks for the rise in monitoring costs. This
assumption pertaining to the contingency of financial contracts enables their models
to insulate banks from lending losses, while leaving the role of bank net worth and
capital requirement largely ignored. However, banks in the reality are inevitably
exposed to credit risks, with only a part of which can be transferred to entrepreneurs
in the form of a loan premium. When unanticipated default occurs, bank equity plays
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an crucial role in absorbing lending losses. Therefore, to rationalize the existence of
capital requirement described below and add realism to the model, I assume that
a typical loan contract can only be signed based on the expectation of Rkt+1, so
that credit risks which arise from exogenous shocks are borne by both parties of the
contract.






An important observation is that an unanticipated adverse shock depressing Rkt+1
raises ωi,t+1 and the associated entrepreneurial default probability unexpectedly. In
BGG and CMR (2010, 2014), the loan rate Zt can vary conditional on realized vari-
ables at period t + 1, which guarantees that entrepreneurs will bear all aggregate
risks.6 However, since Zt in my model is preset at the end of period t, loan losses
stemming from a lower-than-expected realization of Rkt+1 cannot be passed on to en-
trepreneurs and thus potentially erode banks’ net worth. This provides the rationale
for the capital requirement imposed on banks, which stipulates that banks must hold
some amount of net worth as a buffer against possible credit losses.7 Nevertheless, due
to one-period maturity of bank loans, the unexpected change in default probability
during period t+ 1 can be reflected in the contract during period t+ 2.
6The participation constraint (with equality) in their models can be written as:









which has to hold in every possible realization of Rkt+1.
7We will discuss this in greater details in the next subsection.
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Define the leverage ratio of the entrepreneur i as Lei,t ≡
QtKi,t+1
Nei,t
, and combined with





which ωi,t+1 is determined by (3.14) and is thus state contingent. As is detailed in
Appendix C, all entrepreneurs select the same combination of (Let , ωt+1) regardless of
their net worth level. This feature allows me to drop all subscript i for entrepreneur-
specific variables, and facilitates the aggregation of the entrepreneurial sector. The
optimal contract can thus be characterized by a menu of (Let , ωt+1) maximizing en-



















where Ft+1 (ωt+1) and Gt+1 (ωt+1) denote shares of capital earnings acquired by en-








ωt+1dΨt+1 (ωt+1)− [1− Ψt+1 (ωt+1)]ωt+1, (3.17)
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and




= [1− Ψt+1 (ωt+1)]ωt+1 + (1− µ)
∫ ωt+1
0
ωt+1dΨt+1 (ωt+1) , (3.18)
respectively.







, where S (·) is increasing in





, defined as the spread between the
expected average return on capital and the required rate of return on bank loans.






increases entrepreneurs’ expected profit margin and reduces the probability
of default, which incentivizes entrepreneurs to expand their leverages. Note that
the expected external finance premium is taken as given in the optimal contracting






in the entrepreneurial leverage, which can be explained by the fact that an elevated
leverage raises the probability of entrepreneurial defaults, and thus a higher external
finance premium is required to cover the resulting increase in monitoring costs.
To ensure that entrepreneurs are not able to save themselves out of financial
constraints, I assume that after entrepreneurs have settled their obligations to banks,
a fraction 1 − pe of them transfer their net worth to the representative household
and exit the market. Meanwhile, these exiting entrepreneurs are replaced by an equal
mass of entrants with transfers from the household as their start-up equity. Aggregate
entrepreneurial net worth at the end of period t+1 after the resolution of uncertainty,
denoted as N et+1, is thus given as:






where W e denotes the amount of lump-sum transfers from the household to new
entrepreneurs, which is sufficiently small under reasonable calibration.
In face of an exogenous shock, since Zt cannot be adjusted upon impact, ωt+1 is
less responsive relative to BGG and CMR (2010, 2014) according to (3.14). Since
Ft+1 (·) is a decreasing function8, the modification of timing in my model reduces the
fluctuation of ωt+1 and thus entrepreneurial net worth. Intuitively, in response to
an adverse shock that causes an unexpected increase in default rates, banks cannot
raise Zt to insulate themselves from impaired balance sheets, which obliges them to
partially share credit risks with entrepreneurs. Therefore, entrepreneurs absorb less
amount of net worth losses on their balance sheets, which comes at the cost of a
depletion of bank equity. Note that the actual revenues received by banks conditional
on the realization of Rkt+1 is given as:
ZtBt [1− Ψt+1 (ωt+1)] + (1− µ)Rkt+1QtKt+1
∫ ωt+1
0
ωt+1dΨt+1 (ωt+1) . (3.20)
Therefore, combining (3.12) and (3.20), the amount of loan gains/losses due to a
realized value Rkt+1 higher/lower than expected is given as:














where the first term on the right-hand-side indicates gains/losses due to the un-




t+1 (ωt+1) = −ωt+1ψt+1 (ωt+1)− [1− Ψt+1 (ωt+1)] + ωt+1ψt+1 (ωt+1)
= − [1− Ψt+1 (ωt+1)] < 0.
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lending rate Zt, while the remainder specifies gains/losses due to unanticipated change
in monitoring costs. Therefore, Ξt+1 also indicates the unexpected loan gains/losses
incurred on banks’ balance sheets, and will show up in the description of banks’ prob-
lem below. To lighten notation in the subsequent subsection, I denote Ξt+1 = ξt+1Bt,
where

















There is a unit continuum of banks, which are meant to capture the entire financial
intermediary sector (commercial and investment banks). As described in the previous
subsection, a typical bank negotiates loan contracts with entrepreneurs and holds a
perfectly diversified loan portfolio. Meanwhile, its liability side is comprised of one-
period deposits issued to the representative household and net worth. More formally,
the asset side of the banking sector consists of entrepreneurial loans Bt, funded by
household deposits Dt issued at a nominal gross rate of Rt, and net worth N bt , then
the intermediary balance sheet reads as:
Bt = Dt +N
b
t ≡ LbtN bt , (3.23)
where Lbt is defined as the leverage ratio of the banking sector at period t.
It is noteworthy to point out that my assumption on banks’ asset side stands in
contrast to mainstream setting in macro-finance models (e.g., Gertler and Kiyotaki
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2010; Gertler and Karadi 2011; Brunnermeier and Sannikov 2014), which usually as-
sume that banks own entrepreneurs’/producers’ capital stock and hold equity stakes
in productive firms, thus implicitly combining balance sheets of production and in-
termediary sectors. Instead, in my model, banks hold debt-like loans on their balance
sheets, which are subject to default risks of entrepreneurs, an assumption which co-
incides better with the reality. Also, to keep our focus on the role of capital require-
ments, my description of banks’ behavior ignores the liquidity management problem,
and thus excludes a trade-off between holding liquid but low-return cash reserves and
illiquid loans with higher expected returns.
Meanwhile, banks are subject to a Basel-style risk-based capital requirement,
which imposes an upper bound on their risk-weighted assets relative to their net
worth. Due to the timing of loan contracts described in the previous subsection,
banks are exposed to the probability of unexpected loan losses which can reduce their
net worth lower than regulatory minimum, at least temporarily. In this sense, the
usual inequality constraint which is standard in the financial intermediary literature9
is no longer valid here. Therefore, I follow Benes and Kumhof (2015) and assume
that a bank has to pay a pecuniary penalty to the government when its capital ad-
equacy ratio, defined as the ratio of the bank’s capital position to its risk-weighted
assets, is below the regulatory target. Also, to avoid the unrealistic result that either
all or none of banks violate the capital requirement, I assume that banks receive id-
iosyncratic shocks to their gross returns on loans. Technically, loosely similar to the
entrepreneurs’ problem, this specification enables me to capture fractional violation
of the capital requirement in the banking sector.
Specifically, after the average return on loans Rbt+1 is realized, a typical individual
9For example, Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010, 2015), Gertler and Karadi (2011), Iacoviello (2014),
Clerc, et al. (2015), Rannenberg (2016), Elenev, Landvoigt, and Van Nieuwerburgh (2018), Kurtz-
man and Zeke (2019), and Begenau (forthcoming).
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bank is subject to an idiosyncratic shock, ωbt+1, which converts its loan return into
ωbt+1R
b
t+1. The random variable ωbt+1 is i.i.d. across banks and across time, log-




















The idiosyncratic shocks to returns on loans can be motivated by individual factors
not explicitly modeled (e.g., exposures to household loans with different credit quality)
which lead individual banks’ loan returns to deviate from the corresponding average
level in the whole banking sector. The Basel-style capital requirement stipulates that
banks should hold a certain percentage of risk-weighted assets in terms of equity.




t+1Bt −RtDt + Ξt+1 ≥ λΘt+1ωbt+1Rbt+1Bt, (3.24)
where λ denotes the regulatory minimum capital adequacy ratio, while Θt+1 is the
period-t+ 1 risk weight assigned to bank loans of the corresponding period. As I will
be elaborate below, Θ can be constant or time-varying depending on the specification
of capital requirement. Since loans to entrepreneurs are the only type of assets on
the bank’s balance sheet,10 the total amount of risk-weighted assets held by the bank
at period t+ 1 is shown as Θt+1ωbt+1Rbt+1Bt. Also, as in Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010)
and Gertler and Karadi (2011), the bank is unable to issue new equity, and thus
the movement in its net worth occurs via retained earnings. Hence the left-hand-
10In practice, banks can get access to government bonds, which receive a zero risk weight in both
Basel I and Basel II due to their risk-free characteristics. Under this scenario, banks are not required
to increase their capital holdings in correspondence to additional units of government bonds on their
balance sheets. While this extension can generate an interesting portfolio choice problem between
risky but productive business loans and safe but non-productive bonds, it does not essentially affect
the results of this paper regarding the impact of different versions of Basel Accords on the real
economy. Therefore, without loss of generality, I assume that banks cannot invest in government
bonds.
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side of (3.24) represents the bank’s net worth after all shocks are realized at period
t + 1 (but before the penalty due to violation of the capital requirement is paid
out), where the last term, Ξt+1, represents the unexpected loan gains/losses defined
in (3.21). Recalling the previous subsection, Ξt+1 can be either positive or negative
conditional on the realization of shocks at period t+ 1. For example, confronted with
a negative shock which depresses Rkt+1 unexpectedly, since the bank has to commit
to a loan rate which is lower than necessary to cover monitoring costs, Ξt+1 shows up
as a negative number, indicating unexpected loan losses which cause a reduction in
banks’ net worth.
Now we are in the position to formalize the calculation of risk weights, Θ, in (3.24),
which stands as the core feature which differentiates the two regimes of capital re-
quirement studied in this paper, i.e., Basel I and Basel II. Under Basel I, business
loans receive a 100% risk weight regardless of their default properties. In compari-
son, Basel II refines the computation of risk weights by introducing a risk-sensitive
methodology in order to better reflect the riskiness of assets on banks’ balance sheets.
Accordingly, the risk weight attached to entrepreneurial loans are determined on the
basis of their default probabilities.11 In particular, following Agénor and Pereira
da Silva (2012) and Agénor, Alper, and Pereira da Silva (2012), the risk weight is







where Ft+1 (ωt+1) represents the default probability of loans to entrepreneurs, with
11The actual implementation of Basel II offers a menu of approaches to evaluate the probability
of default. The internal ratings based (IRB) approach allows banks to use their own rating systems
to calculate borrowers’ probability of default, while the standardized approach is based on external
ratings. These two approaches are essentially identical in the assumptions of this paper. See Repullo
and Suarez (2004) for a more detailed discussion of different loan pricing mechanisms under these
two approaches.
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F (ω) indicating its corresponding steady-state value.12 Note that the risk weight
equals to unity in the steady state of the economy. Under Basel II, χ > 0 denotes
the sensitivity of risk weight to the change in default probability. An important
observation is that the case of Basel-I-type capital requirement is nested in (3.25)
by setting χ = 0, which implies that the risk weight is unresponsive to the variation
in entrepreneurial default probability over time. Therefore, the tightness of capital
requirement imposed on banks is determined primarily by the parameter λ and the
risk weight Θt+1. While the former can be considered as a policy parameter set by
the regulator applicable to both specifications of Basel Accords, the potentially time-
varying risk weight, which is endogenously pinned down by the entrepreneurs’ default
risks, lies at the core of the Basel II-type risk-based capital requirement.
We can immediately derive from (3.24) that there is a cutoff value ωbt+1, which di-
vides the states under which banks meet the capital requirement from those breaching











where the second equality follows from definitions of Lbt and ξt+1. Banks which are
hit by ωbt+1 lower than ωbt+1 fail to meet the capital requirement and make penalty
payment to the government. We can observe from (3.26) that ωbt+1 is decreasing
in ξt+1 and increasing in Lbt , which imply that both a rise in unexpected loan losses
(corresponding to a negative value of ξt+1) and an elevated leverage ratio can lead to a
higher probability of violating the capital requirement. The former result is intuitive,
while the latter can be explained by noting that a higher bank leverage implies a
12Justification for this expression of the risk weight in terms of entrepreneurial default probability,
derived from the Basel II formula in practice, can also be found in Covas and Fujita (2010) and
Darracq Paries, Kok Sørensen, and Rodriguez-Palenzuela (2011).
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lower capacity for banks’ net worth to absorb unexpected negative shocks, which
exposes them to a higher risk of being under-capitalized. Besides, a tighter capital
requirement (i.e., a rise in λΘt+1) imposed on banks can also raise their likelihood of
violating (3.24). Again following Benes and Kumhof (2015), in the event of banks’
violation of (3.24), they need to pay a penalty equal to a fraction τ of their loans.
Given the beginning-of-period t net worth N bt and taking into account the regula-
tory framework detailed above, a typical bank chooses loan level Bt (and correspond-
ing deposits Dt = Bt − N bt ) to maximize its expected level of net worth at the end
of the period t, net of expected penalty due to violation of the capital requirement.




































Note that (3.27) is independent of a specific bank’s net worth, which allows me to
preserve the framework of a representative bank and deletes the bank-specific index
in the description of the bank’s problem. In a frictionless capital market without
regulation (i.e., τ = 0), the risk-adjusted spread between the loan rate and the risk-
free interest rate is always zero; otherwise banks will expand their loans until rates
on loans and deposits are equated. With the capital requirement imposed on banks,
however, this spread is positive to compensate banks for penalty payment due to
possible violation of the capital requirement. Therefore, the premium is determined
predominantly by the penalty parameter, τ , and ωbt+1, which is directly related to the
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likelihood of not complying with the capital requirement.
Importantly, (3.27), combined with (3.25) and (3.26), strongly hints at the mech-
anism via which Basel II can potentially amplify or dampen the business cycle fluc-
tuations. A rise in entrepreneurial default risks and the endogenous increase in risk
weight attached to bank loans to entrepreneurs, the latter of which is equivalent to
a stricter capital requirement, raises the probability of banks violating the capital




− Rt is then required to
compensate for the costs associated with a higher expected level of penalty payment.
Ultimately, these additional costs are passed on to entrepreneurs in the form of an
increased financing cost, which serves to stifle corporate investment and production.
Therefore, the cyclical impact exerted by the adoption of Basel II crucially relies on
the direction and magnitude of endogenous responses of entrepreneurial default risks
and corresponding risk weights.
To avoid the possibility that banks can accumulate sufficient net worth so the
capital requirement becomes irrelevant in the long run, I impose a similar assumption
as in the entrepreneurial sector: at each period a fixed fraction 1−pb of banks transfer
their equity to the representative household and exit the banking sector, replaced by
an equal measure of banks with lump-sum transfers from the household as their initial
start-up funds. Accordingly, the aggregate level of bank net worth evolves according
to:



























where the term in the bracket on the right-hand-side represents the dynamics of
existing banks’ net worth, and W b denotes the transfers from the household to new
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banks. This closes my description of the banking sector.
3.3.6 The Government and Resource Constraint
The government performs three tasks. First it imposes capital regulation on banks,
and collects penalty payment from those violating the regulatory requirement. Apart
from its role as the banking regulator, the government also implements monetary and
fiscal policies.
As regards the monetary policy, the nominal risk-free rate is set according to a













where ψπ and ψy are feedback coefficients on inflation and GDP gap, respectively,
ρr is the smoothing parameter in the policy rule, and Xt represents GDP, with X∗t
denoting its natural (flexible-price equilibrium) level. According to the monetary
policy rule, the government smoothly adjusts the nominal interest rate in response
to deviation of inflation from its steady-state value, and to the level of GDP gap,
defined as the ratio between the actual and natural levels of GDP.
The fiscal policy is characterized by government consumption denoted as Gct , mod-
eled as a constant proportion, ḡ, of the output at each period shown as:
Gct = ḡYt. (3.30)
The government consumption is financed by lump-sum taxes, short-term government
bond, and penalty payment from banks violating the capital requirement. We assume
that the government maintains a constant debt level, and thus we have Mt − Dt =
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Mt+1 −Dt+1. The balanced government budget at period t requires:




Bt−1 − (Rt − 1) (Mt −Dt) , (3.31)
where the second term on the right-hand-side indicates the penalty handed over by
banks not meeting the capital requirement.
I adopt the usual sequence of market equilibrium concept, under which various
agents maximize their objective functions and all markets clear, and close the model
description by the resource constraint given as:









ωtdΨt+1 (ωt+1) , (3.32)
where the last term on the right-hand-side represents aggregate resources used for
monitoring defaulting entrepreneurs. And the GDP is defined as the amount of final
goods net of monitoring costs formally expressed as:





A period in the model is one quarter. I divide model parameters into three sets.
The first set consists of parameters pertinent to the real side of the economy, which
are standard in the New Keynesian DSGE literature. The second set contains pa-
rameters related to financial frictions faced by entrepreneurs, and those pertaining
to the banking regulation. The remaining parameters are associated with govern-
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ment policies and structural shocks. Regarding parameters which are calibrated to
match steady-state features of the economy, I use the U.S. data over the period from
1990Q1-2014Q4. My parameter choices are reported in Table 3.1.
Parameters related to the real economy are fixed at values commonly used in the
literature. In particular, I set the time discount factor, the degree of habit formation
and the inverse labor elasticity to β = 0.995, h = 0.6, and η = 0.33. Regarding
parameters pertaining to capital accumulation, the depreciation rate δ, the curvature
of investment adjustment costs, and the capital income share are fixed at 0.025, 2, and
0.33, respectively. Also, closely following Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005),
I assume that the elasticity of substitution among intermediate goods and Calvo
parameter are ε = 10 and κ = 0.6, respectively, so that the steady-state markup is
1.11, and retailers reoptimize every 2.5 quarters on average.
The second set of model parameters, which are associated with financial side of
the economy, are relatively non-standard. I categorize them into two subsets. The
first subset consists of parameters tied to the entrepreneurial sector, including the
monitoring cost parameter µ, the steady-state value of the standard deviation of
idiosyncratic shocks σ, the survival probability of entrepreneurs pe, and households’
transfer to new entrepreneurs W e. µ is set equal to the estimate of CMR (2014),
which lies within the range which Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) consider as empirically
reasonable. Closely similar to Rannenberg (2016), I calibrate σ̄ to ensure that the
default probability and leverage of non-financial firms in the steady state match their
respective empirical counterparts. The target for default probability is 0.6%, close to
the estimated value by CMR (2014), while the targeted value of corporate leverage
is 2, which is taken from Benes and Kumhof (2015) and close to the value used in
Rannenberg (2016). I fix pe at 0.98, fairly close to values used by BGG and CMR




β Households’ discount factor 0.995
h Habit formation 0.6
η Inverse Frisch labor elasticity 0.33
δ Capital depreciation rate 0.025
ηI Curvature of investment adjustment costs 2
α Capital share of income 0.33
ε Elasticity of substitution among intermediate goods 10
κ Calvo parameter 0.6
Entrepreneurs and Banks
µ Monitoring costs 0.25
σ̄ Steady-state s.d. of entrepreneurs’ idiosyncratic shocks 0.31
pe Survival probability of entrepreneurs 0.98
W e Transfers to new entrepreneurs 0.006
λ Regulatory minimum capital adequacy ratio 0.08
σb S.d. of banks’ idiosyncratic shocks 0.016
τ Penalty costs 0.004
χ Elasticity of risk weight to default prob. (under Basel II) 0.65
pb Survival probability of banks 0.99
W b Transfers to new banks 0.001
Fiscal and Monetary Policies; Shocks
gc Government spending to output ratio 0.2
ρr Monetary policy smoothing parameter 0.8
ψπ Policy weight on inflation 1.5
ψx Policy weight on GDP gap 0.4
ρa AR (1) coefficient of TFP shock 0.979
σa Standard deviation of TFP shock 0.0074
ρI AR (1) coefficient of MEI shock 0.6
σI Standard deviation of MEI shock 0.05
ρσ AR (1) coefficient of risk shock 0.9
σσ Standard deviation of risk shock 0.1
Table 3.1: Model Parameters
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I then turn to the second subset of parameters pertinent to the banking sector. In
line with both versions of Basel Accords (BCBS 1988, 2004), the regulatory minimum
capital requirement imposed on the banking sector, λ, is set to 0.08. Regarding the
steady-state standard deviation of idiosyncratic shocks on banks’ returns, σb, and the
penalty cost parameter, τ , I follow the calibration strategy of Benes and Kumhof
(2015). In particular, I target the ratio of banks violating the capital requirement of
2% and the excess return on bank loans of 0.30% (adjusted annually), from which I
obtain σb = 0.016 and τ = 0.004. The sensitivity of the risk weight with respect to
the entrepreneurial default probability under Basel II is parameterized at χ = 0.65,
a conservative number which coincides with Covas and Fujita (2010). The survival
probability of banks, pb, equals to the value used in Rannenberg (2016),13 which
allows me to solve for transfers received by new banks from households, W b.
The final set of parameters is related to government policies and structural shocks.
The steady-state ratio of government consumption to output is set to 0.2. As regards
the monetary policy rule, I set feedback coefficients on inflation and GDP gap to
ψπ = 1.5 and ψx = 0.4, respectively, along with the policy smoothing parameter
ρr = 0.8, broadly consistent with values used in the DSGE literature. The constant
proportion of government expenditure relative to output g is set to match the long-
run ratio of government consumption to GDP. Then I calibrate parameters governing
the three shock processes considered in this paper: a TFP shock, a MEI shock, and
a risk shock. I select ρa = 0.979 following King and Rebelo (1999), and calibrate σa
to ensure that the standard deviation of GDP implied by the model coincides with
the data. The persistence and standard deviation of both MEI and risk shock closely
13The calibrated value of pb is noticeably higher than that used in Nuño and Thomas (2017),
mainly stemming from the difference in targeted moments between these papers. Nuño and Thomas
(2017) calibrate the continuation probability of banks to match the volatility of physical investment
in the data.
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follow Benes and Kumhof (2015). While the selection of ρI and σI are conservative
compared to values usually adopted in the DSGE literature, the chosen values of ρσ
and σk are fairly close to the estimated results provided by, e.g., CMR (2014) and
Lindé, Smets and Wouters (2016).
3.4.2 Impulse Responses
I will compare the economy’s responses to exogenous shocks under the risk-insensitive
Basel I and the risk-based Basel II. Three types of shocks are considered: a risk
shock, a TFP shock, and a MEI shock. The TFP shock is chosen following the lead
of the canonical RBC literature, while the MEI shock is included since its role as a
driver of business cycles has received growing attention in the recent DSGE literature
(e.g., Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti 2010, 2011; Lindé, Smets, and Wouters
2016). The risk shock, categorized as a financial shock in this paper, is closely related
to entrepreneurs’ and banks’ balance sheet conditions, and is analyzed due to its
potential importance in driving aggregate fluctuations when financial frictions are
taken into account (CMR 2010, 2014).
In all figures below, solid and dotted lines depict the model’s responses under
Basel I (χ = 0) and II (χ > 0), respectively, based on calibration results shown in
the previous subsection. Variables related to return rates and ratios are displayed
as percentage point deviations from their respective steady-state values, while other
variables are expressed as percentage deviations. Also, inflation and interest rate
spreads, shown in panels (c), (g), (h), and (i), respectively, are annualized.
Figure 3.1 presents the impulse responses of selected variables to an adverse risk
shock of one standard deviation. Under both regimes of capital requirements, a rise
in risk leads to a noticeable fall in output, investment, and inflation, as shown in
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Figure 3.1: IRFs to an Adverse Risk Shock (....: Basel I; —: Basel II)
panels (a) to (c), which can be explained by the mechanism proposed by CMR (2010,
2014). Specifically, an increase in risk raises entrepreneurs’ default probability, and
the associated increase in monitoring costs is partially passed on to entrepreneurs in
the form of a higher loan rate, which causes a decline in entrepreneurial borrowing
and a consequent drop in investment and output. The negative response of output
naturally stifles inflation. Simultaneously, the reduction in investment induces a fall
in the price of capital and an increase in the excess return on capital over the required
return on bank loans (i.e., EtRKt+1−EtRbt+1 as shown in panel (h)), which also curtail
the net worth of entrepreneurs and lead to a jump in the entrepreneurial leverage
(panel (e)). Note that the interaction between the price of capital and net worth
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triggers a classic financial accelerator mechanism, via which the impacts of the risk
shock are amplified and propagated.
The inclusion of the banking sector and corresponding regulatory requirements,
along with the modification on the contingency of financial contracts, activates an-
other amplification mechanism of the risk shock. In particular, since banks need
to commit to the current-period loan rate determined before the realization of the
risk shock, an unexpected increase in entrepreneurial default erodes their net worth,
which in turn raises the bank leverage on impact (panel (f)) and exposes banks to
a larger risk of being under-capitalized. In response, banks suppress their supply
of credit (panel (d)), and charge a higher spread between loan and policy rates, i.e.,
EtR
b
t+1−Rt (panel (i)). The latter effect enhances the upward movement of the exter-
nal finance premium, defined as EtRkt+1 −Rt (panel (g)), and reinforces the financial
accelerator mechanism shown in the previous paragraph.
Crucially, as evidenced by a comparison of the model’s responses across two
regimes of regulatory requirements, Basel II adds more volatility to macroeconomic
and financial variables of interest, a clear indication that the Basel II-type risk-based
capital requirement reinforces the procyclical tendencies of the credit market and
the real economy. The procyclical effect of Basel II is a direct result of the posi-
tive relation between default probability and the risk weight attached to bank loans.
More specifically, according to the risk weight calculation expressed in (3.25), a larger
probability of entrepreneurs’ default corresponds to a higher risk weight and thus an
increase in the volume of risk-weighted assets, which in turn tightens the capital re-
quirement imposed on banks. Consequently, banks are exposed to a higher risk of
violating the more stringent regulation, which forces them to increase the loan rate
and rebuild their net worth more quickly than under the risk-insensitive Basel I re-
quirement. A widening loan spread causes a rise in external finance premium, and
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Figure 3.2: IRFs to an Adverse TFP Shock (....: Basel I; —: Basel II)
the elevated cost of credit is then transmitted into the real economy and amplifies
aggregate fluctuations.
Figure 3.2 depicts responses of the model to a negative TFP shock under Basel I
and II. The adverse TFP shock depresses outputand investment while boosts inflation
(panels (a) to (c)), as is commonly observed in a technology-driven recession. Differ-
ent from the case of a risk shock, the TFP shock barely affects the default probability
of entrepreneurs (0.052% higher than its steady-state value at the peak value). There-
fore, the impact of the TFP shock on bank loans operates mainly through a reduced
loan demand from entrepreneurs rather than a decreased credit supply which emerges
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from the depletion of bank equity. Correspondingly, a decline in bank leverage is ob-
served (panel (f)), as opposed to the response to the risk shock. A lower leverage
reduces banks’ risk of violating the regulatory requirement and paying penalty, which
is reflected in a smaller spread between loan and policy rates (panel (i)). The logic
regarding the procyclicality of Basel II-type risk-based capital requirement described
above still holds qualitatively; however, due to the limited responsiveness of default
probability and the corresponding risk weight, Basel II fails dramatically at producing
quantitatively perceptible procyclical effects. This is clearly evident when we com-
pare the model’s responses to the TFP shock under Basel I and Basel II, in which
the difference between the two sets of responses is hardly discernible.
Finally, the behavior of model variables in response to a contractionary MEI shock
is exhibited in Figure 3.3. Interestingly, since the MEI shock shifts the capital supply
curve inward, the price of capital goes up, thereby improving entrepreneurs’ balance
sheets and depressing the entrepreneurial leverage (panel (e)) and the excess return
on capital over the required loan return (panel (h)). Moreover, a lower than expected
probability of entrepreneurial default influences banks’ capital positions positively,
which, in conjunction with a reduction in loan demand, drives down the bank leverage
(panel (f)) and feeds into a lower spread between loan and risk-free rates (panel
(i)). With regard to the cyclical effects of Basel II, note that a reduced default
probability decreases the risk weight of bank loans and thus equivalently relaxes
the regulatory requirement faced by banks. Therefore, rather than magnifying the
volatility of macroeconomic and financial variables, the implementation of a risk-
based capital requirement provides a countercyclical force and dampens the economy’s
response to a MEI shock, which stand in contrast to the cases of risk and TFP
shocks. However, similar to the response to a TFP shock, the entrepreneurial default
probability is only marginally affected under the MEI shock, thereby limiting the
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Figure 3.3: IRFs to to an Adverse MEI Shock (....: Basel I; —: Basel II)
quantitative significance of the stabilizing effect stated above.
In summary, the direction and magnitude of the cyclical effect stemming from
Basel II strongly hinge on the nature of exogenous shocks that hit the economy. In
the wake of shocks which increase (decrease) output and simultaneously strengthen
(weaken) balance sheets of entrepreneurial and banking sectors (risk and TFP shocks
in my model), the Basel II-type risk-based capital requirement tends to have a pro-
cyclical impact on the credit market and the macroeconomy; however, in case of
shocks which move the output and the soundness of balance sheet conditions in the
opposite directions (the MEI shock), Basel II serves to stabilize the economy relative
to the risk-insensitive Basel I. Also, under a financial shock (the risk shock in my
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case) which directly deteriorates balance sheets of entrepreneurs and banks, the in-
clusion of Basel II raises non-negligible procyclicality concerns; in contrast, when the
economy is subject to a shock which directly influences the real side of the economy
while affects the equity positions of these two sectors to a relatively modest degree
(TFP and MEI shocks), the difference between responses to such a shock under the
two regulatory regimes is quantitatively insignificant.
Regarding policy implications of my quantitative findings, two remarks are in
order. First, since the procyclicality of Basel II depends on the nature of macroe-
conomic shocks, policy-makers should identify the source of shocks to ensure that
macro-prudential policies can be appropriately designed to counteract the destabi-
lizing effects of Basel II. Second, the procyclicality issue that emerges from Basel II
can elicit a tradeoff between financial and macroeconomic stabilization. As a critical
building block of the financial regulation system in the past decade, Basel II is moti-
vated to guard against excessive risk-taking and promote the stability in the banking
system. However, since Basel II can potentially cause the unintended consequence
of generating an unfavorable procyclical effect, policy-makers may have to confront a
tradeoff between stabilizing the banking system and reducing macroeconomic volatil-
ity. Moreover, this tradeoff tends to worsen when the economy is hit by a financial
shock. Although the possibility of bank bankruptcy and, in a broader sense, sys-
tematic risks in the banking system, are not taken into account in my framework,
the tradeoff between financial and macroeconomic stabilization still stands out as a
crucial policy implication of my model.
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3.5 Concluding Remarks and Directions for Future Work
I have presented a DSGE model augmented by financial constraints on entrepreneurs
and banks, featuring a Basel-like regulatory requirement on bank capital. The main
novelty of my framework is an explicit characterization of the relation between the
default probability of bank loans and the risk weight assigned to them, which cor-
responds to the crucial modification of Basel II relative to Basel I. I study impulse
responses of the model to three types of shocks, namely a risk shock, a TFP shock, and
a MEI shock, under two regimes of bank capital requirement, i.e., Basel I and Basel
II. The direction and magnitude of cyclical effect which arises from Basel II strongly
rely on the nature of macroeconomic shocks that hit the economy. While Basel II
magnifies the degree of procyclicality under risk and TFP shocks by enhancing the
volatility of financial and macroeconomic variables, it exerts a stabilizing effect on the
credit market and the real economy relative to the case of Basel I under a MEI shock.
Also, Basel II is able to generate a non-negligible quantitative impact compared to
Basel I only when the economy is subject to a risk shock, which conspicuously affects
the default probability of entrepreneurs and alter balance sheets of entrepreneurial
and banking sectors.
A direct implication of my quantitative results is that the design of macropru-
dential policy needs to take the source of macroeconomic shocks into consideration.
While the identification of shocks has played a pivotal role in macroeconomic research
for the past decades, its relation to macroprudential policies has been largely ignored
by academia and policy-makers. However, my analysis on macroeconomic outcomes
of Basel II provides the rationale for this relation. In particular, since the direction
and magnitude of cyclical effects originating from the adoption of Basel II vary under
different types of shocks, identifying the source of business cycle shocks is critical
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before deciding how aggressively policy-makers should counterbalance the additional
macroeconomic volatility owing to the implementation of the Basel II. Allowing for
a richer array of shocks and estimating the full model will enable us to evaluate
more rigorously the net impact of the Basel II-type risk-based capital requirement on
business cycle fluctuations, which I believe is a promising avenue for future studies.
Also, although the concern of financial stability is outside the scope of my analysis
for the sake of model tractability, the tradeoff between financial and macroeconomic
stability still stands out as a crucial policy implication of this paper. This tradeoff
leaves room for the coordination between macroprudential and other types of macroe-
conomic policies. Therefore, a natural extension of my model is to incorporate the
possibility of bank bankruptcy and corresponding financial stabilization policies, along
with their interaction and coordination with monetary policy, as in Lewis and Roth
(2018). I leave this extension to future research.
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Appendices
A. Appendix for Chapter 1
A.1 Technical Reason to Assume λ < 1
If the government provides full guarantee for banks loans, i.e., λ = 1, then from
(1.13), it is straightforward to derive:
Z = R, (3.34)


















Note that when L→∞, ω → R
R
K
, which implies that, when the loan rate is fixed and
does not vary with the leverage ratio, the impact of a rise of leverage on the cutoff
value of ω (and thus the entrepreneur’s share of the proceeds) is limited. Hence an
entrepreneur will optimally choose an infinite amount of leverage, which cannot occur
under equilibrium. This excludes the case λ = 1.
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A.2 Proof of Proposition in 1.4
This appendix provides the proof of the proposition stated in section 1.4. Notations
used here are the same as those in the paper, and I drop the time subscript and type
superscript as in section 1.4 for ease of notation.
The optimal loan contract problem is reiterated here, which involves maximizing




subject to the representative bank’s participation constraint with free entry condition:





ωdΨ (ω)− [1− Ψ (ω)]ω, (3.39)
G (ω) = [1− Ψ (ω)]ω + (1− µ)
∫ ω
0
ωdΨ (ω) , (3.40)
H (ω) = ω −G (ω) . (3.41)
Note that F ′ (ω) = − (1− Ψ (ω)) < 0, F ′′ (ω) = ψ (ω)>0, and H ′ (ω) = Ψ (ω) +








to guarantee that the interior solution is a non-rationing outcome, i.e., only the equi-
librium under which ω lies below the maximum feasible value is considered. It im-
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mediately follows that G′ (ω) = 1 − Ψ (ω) − µωψ (ω) > 0, and G′ (ω) + λH ′ (ω) =
1− (1− λ) (Ψ (ω) + µωψ (ω)) > 0 for λ ∈ [0, 1).
Define ι as the Lagrange multiplier on the bank’s participation constraint, then
first-order conditions of the optimal contracting problem with respect to ωj, L, and
ι are given as:
ι = − F
′ (ω)










F (ω) + ι [G (ω) + λH (ω)]
, (3.43)







−F ′′ (ω) [G′ (ω) + λH ′ (ω)] + F ′ (ω) [G′′ (ω) + λH ′′ (ω)]
[G′ (ω) + λH ′ (ω)]2
.
Following BGG, the numerator is positive under the interior solution, and thus ∂ι
∂ω
> 0.









[G (ω) + λH (ω)]− F (ω) G′(ω)+λH′(ω)
F ′(ω)
.




F ′ (ω)H (ω)− F (ω)H ′ (ω)
F (ω)
F ′(ω)
{−F ′′ (ω) [G′ (ω) + λH ′ (ω)] + F ′ (ω) [G′′ (ω) + λH ′′ (ω)]}
. (3.45)
Based on the properties of functions F (·), G (·), and H (·) stated above, both nu-




(3.44) we can express the leverage as:
L =
1






Since G (ω) + λH (ω) is increasing in both λ and ω, and I have shown that ∂ω
∂λ
> 0,
it is straightforward to conclude ∂L
∂λ
> 0. This completes the proof of the proposition
in section 1.4.
B. Appendix for Chapter 2
B.1 Optimality Conditions in the General Equilibrium
This part is complementary to section 2.1 by providing a more detailed account of
optimality conditions regarding the canonical sectors of the DSGE model.
Intermediate Goods Producers At period t, the representative intermediate






































Denote the Lagrange multiplier associated with (3.47) as ∆t, which can also be in-
terpreted as the nominal marginal cost of producing one unit of intermediate goods,


























































































Retailers and Final Goods Producers At period t, the representative final good







, i ∈ [0, 1], and
























where P Fi,t is the corresponding price at period t. Retailers make pricing decisions
subject to Calvo-style stickiness, with a random fraction 1− κ of retailers being able
to adjust their prices optimally, while the rest of retailers reset prices by indexing
them to the steady-state inflation rate Π. The optimization problem of firms which
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Since all firms allowed to reoptimize in period t face the same problem, they will





















where Λt denotes the marginal utility of nominal income of the representative house-
hold at period t, and βsΛt+s
Λt
indicates the household’s stochastic discount factor be-
tween period t and t + s. Also, Ỹt+s is the corresponding level of aggregate demand
faced by reoptimizing firms at period t+ s.











Capital Goods Producers The representative capital goods producer chooses



























































Households At each period t, the representative household chooses Ct, Mc,t, Dt,

















subject to the flow budget constraint:
PtCt +Dt +Mc,t 6 RD,t−1Dt−1 +Mc,t−1 +WtHt + PtΘt − PtTt. (3.53)
Denote the Lagrange multiplier of (3.53) as Λt, which can also be interpreted as
the marginal utility of nominal income at period t. Then first-order-conditions with










Λt = βEt (Λt+1RD,t+1) , (3.55)










The efficient output is defined as the maximum level of output given fixed amounts






































































































































Substituting (3.61) and (3.62) into (3.58) gives us the following expression of efficient



















First-order conditions of the representative j-type firm are:
WtH
j





















































































































































in which the third equality uses (3.49) and omits the price stickiness in the retail
sector.

































which coincides with equation (2.29) in section 2.2.
C. Appendix for Chapter 3
Regarding chapter 3, a complete set of equations characterizing optimality conditions
of various agents in the model equilibrium is listed below.














subject to the following budget constraint:
PtCt +Mt 6 Rt−1Mt−1 +WtHt + Pt∆t − PtTt. (3.66)
Denote the Lagrange multiplier of (3.66) as Λt. Note that Λt also represents the
marginal utility of period-t nominal income. First-order conditions with respect to















Capital Goods Producers The representative capital goods producer chooses

























indicates the stochastic discount factor of the representative household,
which owns the capital goods producer.






































Intermediate and Final Goods Producers Production function of the interme-



















where MCjt is the Lagrange multiplier on the production function in the cost min-
imization problem, and can also be interpreted as the marginal cost of production.
Equations (3.72) and (3.73) together imply a marginal cost common across all inter-










The representative final good producer bundles the continuum of differentiated

















where Pjt is the price of good j at period t. The usual Calvo-style friction is assumed:
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only a fraction 1 − κ of producers are able to set their prices optimally, while the
rest of them adjust prices by indexing them to past inflation Πt−1 at a rate ιp and to
the steady-state inflation rate Π at rate 1 − ιp. Hence, the optimization problem of
intermediate goods producers which are allowed to re-optimize their prices at period





























Since all producers resetting prices at period t face the identical optimization problem,

















where Ỹt+s is the aggregate demand faced by reoptimizing producers at period t+ s.





















Entrepreneurs As in subsection 3.3.4, the optimal contract between the entrepreneur
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which the strict equality is ensured by the free-entry condition in the banking sector.
Using definitions of leverage ratio given as Lei,t ≡
QtKi,t+1
Nei,t
and the cutoff value of








































ωt+1dΨt+1 (ωt+1)− [1− Ψt+1 (ωi,t+1)]ωi,t+1. (3.81)
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Since capital earnings are split between entrepreneurs, banks, and monitoring costs,
the expected share earned by banks from their the lending to entrepreneur indexed i
can be written as:




= [1− Ψt+1 (ωi,t+1)]ωi,t+1 + (1− µ)
∫ ωi,t+1
0
ωt+1dΨt+1 (ωt+1) . (3.82)


























Since the net worth shows up in a linear fashion in the entrepreneur i’s objective (3.80)
and is absent in banks’ participation constraint (3.84), the same sets of (ωi,t+1, Lei,t)
will be selected by all entrepreneurs regardless of their net worth. Hence the subscript
i can be dropped for notational convenience, and the optimal contract is a menu of
(ωt+1, L
e



















(Let − 1) = 0. (3.86)
Denote ιt as the Lagrange multiplier on (3.86), and first-order conditions of the opti-
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respectively. Also note that F ′t+1 (ωt+1) = − (1− Ψt+1 (ωt+1)) < 0, while the sign of
G
′
t+1 (ωt+1) = 1 − Ψt+1 (ωt+1) − µωt+1ψt+1 (ωt+1) is indeterminate. Following BGG,








to ensure that there exists an interior solution which is a non-rationing outcome. Note
that inequality (3.90) is a weak assumption and is satisfied by most distributions,
including the log-normal distribution used in this paper.
The evolution of aggregate entrepreneurial net worth at the end of period t + 1
after the resolution of uncertainty, denoted as N et+1, is thus given as:



















where the first equality uses the definition of cutoff value given by (3.79).
After Rkt+1 is realized at period t + 1, the actual revenues received by banks can
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be written as:
ZtBt [1− Ψt+1 (ωt+1)] + (1− µ)Rkt+1QtKt+1
∫ ωt+1
0
ωt+1dΨt+1 (ωt+1) . (3.92)
Comparing the left-hand-side of (3.78) and (3.92) gives us the following expression of
loan gains/losses emanating from a realized value Rkt+1 higher/lower than expected:



































Banks Following subsection 3.3.5, the Basel-style risk-based capital requirement is
imposed on banks, and is satisfied only if the following relation holds:
ωbt+1R
b
t+1Bt −RtDt + Ξt+1 ≥ λΘt+1ωbt+1Rbt+1Bt, (3.96)








The cutoff value ωbt+1, which is the minimum value of idiosyncratic shock to banks’















































And the evolution of aggregate bank equity can be summarized as:
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